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Introduction 
 
In the Grant agreement, the key objectives of WP3 are set in the following key points: 
• To identify regions with less developed research and innovation systems 
• To identify the challenges for Member States and Regions with less-developed research and 
innovation systems to maximise the impact of their smart specialisation strategies, focusing on: 
the role of economic structure, the role of knowledge institutions, the role of governance and 
strategy design. 
 
This Research Working Paper aims at providing the interim findings regarding the challenges and 
opportunities facing regions with less-developed research and innovation systems to maximise 
the impact of their smart specialisation strategies. Therefore, this Research Working Paper 
represents an important step towards the final outputs as agreed in the Grant Agreement, i.e. to 
elaborate final manuscript(s) of a peer-reviewed book (collected volume) or 2-3 peer-reviewed 
book chapters or peer-reviewed articles submitted to or accepted by publisher or peer reviewed 
journal. 
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2. Identification of regions with less developed research and innovation systems 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this working paper is to contribute to the debate on how to identify regions with less 
developed research and innovation systems. We look at both conceptual and empirical 
approaches that figure prominently in scholarly work on regional innovation systems. Based on a 
critical review and discussion of the literature we shed light on a large number and variety of 
barriers and weaknesses that may hamper regional innovation and industrial change. It is shown 
in this paper that the regional innovation system concept can essentially inform the current debate 
on the design and implementation of smart specialisation strategies. It offers rich insights into 
various dimensions of regional innovation systems that may be weakly developed and allows for 
the development of typologies that capture the heterogeneity of these systems. We also 
demonstrate that empirical approaches to identify regions with less-developed research and 
innovation systems fall short of taking account of the conceptual advances made in the recent 
past.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--------------- 
We are grateful to our colleagues Markus Grillitsch and Teis Hansen at CIRCLE, Lund University for inputs to an 
earlier version of this paper.
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1 Introduction 
 
Smart specialisation has become the new innovation policy paradigm in the European Union. 
This policy concept “is about placing greater emphasis on innovation and having an innovation-
driven development strategy in place that focuses on each region’s strength and competitive 
advantage. It is about specialising in a smart way, i.e. based on evidence and strategic intelligence 
about a region’s assets and the capability to learn what specialisations can be developed in 
relation to those of other regions” (European Union, 2011, p. 7).  
 
Smart specialisation shares a number of commonalities with and has been inspired by other 
modern and influential policy concepts such as the Constructing Regional Advantage (CRA) 
approach (European Commission, 2006; Asheim et al., 2011a; Asheim, 2014; Boschma, 2014a): 
It considers knowledge and innovation as key determinants of regional development and 
emphasizes the need to avoid imitation of successful policies pursued in other regions and “one-
size-fits all” strategies (Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). Smart specialisation strategies are place-
based policy strategies that aim to promote economic diversification of regions (McCann and 
Ortega-Argiles, 2013; Boschma, 2014a) taking into account their unique characteristics and 
assets. Specialised diversification or diversified specialisation (Asheim 2014) should thus rank 
high on policy agendas. The identification and selection of prioritised areas for policy 
intervention are suggested to be the outcome of an “entrepreneurial discovery process”, a notion 
that has been heavily debated in the recent past (Foray and Goenaga, 2013; Foray and Rainoldi, 
2013; Asheim, 2014; Boschma, 2014a). There seems to be an agreement, however, that an 
inclusive approach to the identification of policy priorities (that is, inclusive governance 
structures that allow for the involvement of regional stakeholders in selecting promising areas for 
innovation policy) is important for the success of smart specialisation.  
 
A key question is if smart specialisation strategies are applicable to any type of regions. It has 
been argued that regions with less-favoured research and innovation systems have a low potential 
to diversify into new industrial areas due to unfavourable economic structures and a weak 
endowment of knowledge organisations (Boschma, 2014b, Isaksen and Trippl, 2014a). In 
addition, some less-developed regional research and innovation systems suffer from weak policy 
and governance capacities, which could curtail the effective use of Cohesion policy funds 
(Charron et al. 2014) and may form major barriers to the successful formulation and 
implementation of smart specialisation strategies (Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2014).  
 
This working paper is part of Work Package (WP) 3 of the project “Smart Specialisation for 
Regional Innovation” (funded by the European Commission in the context of the seventh 
framework programme). One of the key goals of this project is to gain new insights into the 
nature, opportunities and challenges for smart specialisation strategies in a large variety of 
regional settings. WP 3 focuses specifically on regions with less-developed research and 
innovation systems. The objectives of this WP are (1) to identify regions with less-developed 
research and innovation systems; and (2) to get a better understanding of the challenges for these 
systems to maximize the impact of smart specialisation strategies, focusing on the roles of 
economic structures, knowledge organizations and governance and strategy design.  
 6 
 
The aim of this working paper is to contribute to the first objective, that is, to identify regions 
with less-developed research and innovation systems. It would be beyond the scope of this paper 
to engage in a discussion of how the specific elements of these systems influence the 
opportunities for smart specialisation or how the challenges faced by these regions might be 
overcome to enhance the impact of smart specialisation strategies (for insights into these issues 
see the other working papers generated in the context of WP 3 as well as the empirical reports on 
a number of case studies that will be published at a later stage of the project). This working paper 
paves the way for these analyses by discussing several conceptual and empirical contributions to 
identify regions with less-developed research and innovation systems, focusing in particular on 
key barriers and missing elements that may be found in these systems. For the sake of clarity, it is 
important to note that in the following parts of this paper only the notion “regional innovation 
system” (RIS) will be used, because we consider the regional research system as a subsystem of 
RIS.   
  
The remainder of this working paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the conceptual 
debate on RIS, system failures, organisational and institutional thinness, knowledge bases and 
regional industrial path development and demonstrates how these concepts can contribute to 
identifying various types of regions with less-developed RIS. In section 3, we provide a critical 
discussion of empirical approaches to categorise less-developed RIS based on measurements of 
their innovation performance. Finally, section 4 concludes and outlines some key issues that 
should receive due attention in future research. 
 
2 Conceptual Approaches 
Research on RIS has grown significantly since the notion’s first articulation and development in 
the early 1990s (for an overview on the theoretical antecedents and origins of the RIS approach, 
its development over the past two decades and recently made advances see Asheim et al. 2011b). 
RIS come in many shapes and various typologies have been suggested to capture this variety 
(see, for instance, Asheim and Isaksen, 2002; Cooke, 2004; Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Asheim 
and Coenen, 2006). In this section we focus on those conceptual ideas (and the typologies that 
emanate from them) that are most relevant for identifying less-developed RIS. We review 
contributions on system failures, organisational and institutional thinness, knowledge bases and 
new regional industrial path development to shed light on potential factors and dimensions in RIS 
that can restrain regional innovation and change. 
 
2.1 System failure approaches 
A well-known conceptual approach for identifying less-developed innovation systems draws 
attention to various types of system deficiencies or system failures that result in low levels of 
innovation activities. Several typologies of system failures exist (see, for instance, Lundvall and 
Borras, 1999), enabling us to spot various dimensions of innovation systems that may be less-
developed or not working adequately. Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005), for example, distinguish 
between infrastructural failures, institutional failures (hard and soft institutional problems), 
interaction failures (strong and weak network failures) and capability failure. Recent work on 
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transformational system failures (Weber and Rohracher, 2012) has further advanced the debate, 
pointing to a set of factors that limit a system’s capacity to undergo processes of transformative 
change towards sustainability. A distinction between four types of transformational failures can 
be drawn: i) directionality failure, ii) demand articulation failure, iii) policy coordination failure, 
and iv) reflexivity failure (Weber and Rohracher, 2012). In the context of this debate, innovation 
systems might be referred to as “less developed” if they exhibit a weak capacity to foster 
transformative change. These insights are highly relevant for smart specialisation as the 
promotion of sustainability and social innovation are often seen as one of the key aims of such 
strategies. 
 
Tödtling and Trippl (2005) have applied the system failure approach to the regional level to 
analyse various deficiencies of RIS. The authors propose a typology that distinguishes between 
three forms of system deficiencies, namely, organisational thinness, negative lock-in, and 
fragmentation (Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1: RIS failures 
System failure / deficiencies Type of region 
Organisational thinness: crucial elements of a RIS are missing: low 
levels of clustering & weak endowment with key organisations 
Peripheral regions 
Negative lock-in: over-embeddedness & overspecialization Old industrial areas 
Fragmentation: lack of interaction between RIS elements Metropolitan regions 
Source: Tödtling and Trippl (2005) 
 
 
This provides the foundation for discerning three main types of less-developed RIS (Tödtling and 
Trippl, 2005; Martin and Trippl, 2014):  
   
• Organisationally thin RIS are systems in which essential elements are only weakly 
developed or even missing. Examples include the lack of a critical mass of innovative 
firms, a weak endowment of other key organisations and institutions and low levels of 
clustering. Organizationally thin RIS are often present in peripheral areas. These regions 
are characterised by insufficient levels of R&D and innovation due to the dominance of 
SMEs in traditional sectors, the lack of assets to nurture new industries, a weak capacity to 
absorb knowledge from outside the region, and a thin structure of supporting organisations 
(Doloreux and Dionne, 2008; Karlsen et al., 2011). 
 
• Locked-in RIS are characterized by an over-embeddedness and over-specialization in 
mature sectors and out-dated technologies. Locked-in RIS often prevail in old industrialised 
areas. The capacity of firms in these areas to generate radical innovation is limited and the 
supporting organisations tend to be too strongly oriented on traditional industries and 
technologies. Various forms of negative lock-in (functional, cognitive and political ones) 
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keep these regions in ancestral development paths (Grabher, 1993; Trippl and Otto 2009; 
Hassink, 2010). 
 
• Fragmented RIS suffer from a lack of connectivity due to a suboptimal level of networking 
and knowledge exchange between actors in the system, leading to insufficient levels of 
collective learning and systemic innovation activities. Fragmented RIS can frequently be 
found in metropolitan areas (Blazek and Zizalova, 2010; OECD, 2010). In this type of 
region fragmentation is often the outcome of too much diversity and a lack of related 
variety, resulting in levels of regional knowledge exchange and innovation below what 
could be expected given the often rich endowments of knowledge exploration as well as 
exploitation organisations found in metropolitan regions.  
 
 
The application of the system failure approach to the regional level has provided important 
insights into potential misconfigurations of RIS, pointing to a variety of elements that might be 
less developed or functioning inadequately. However, the key notion of “thickness” is defined in 
a rather simple way (number of organizations) and remains poorly conceptualized. In particular 
the role of institutions for regional development and innovation (Gertler, 2010; Rodriguez-Pose, 
2013; Charron et al. 2014), that is, the institutional dimension of thickness is only insufficiently 
captured. 
 
More recently, an attempt has been made to elaborate on the notions of thickness and thinness of 
RIS. Based on a comprehensive review and critical discussion of the respective literature, 
Zukauskaite et al. (2014) advocate a clear distinction between the organisational and institutional 
dimension of thinness. Organisational thickness (thinness) refers to the presence (absence) of a 
critical mass of firms, universities, research bodies, support organizations, unions, associations, 
and so on. Institutional thickness (thinness) is defined as the presence (absence) of both formal 
institutions (laws, rules, regulations) and informal institutions (such as an innovation and 
cooperation culture, norms and values) that promote collective learning and knowledge exchange.  
 
Departing from this clear-cut distinction, we advance the argument that RIS may suffer from 
institutional thinness, organisational thinness or a combination of both dimensions of thinness. 
This leads us to distinguish between three types of less-developed RIS (see Table 2): 
 
 
Table 2: Organisational and institutional thickness / thinness of RIS1 
  Organizational thickness Organizational thinness 
Institutional thickness Metropolitan / city regions in Northern 
& Western Europe 
Industrial districts in the Third Italy, 
Nordic peripheral regions 
                                                
1 This matix is based on an idea by Björn Asheim, outlined in a project application for the Marianne and Markus 
Wallenberg Foundation. 
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Institutional thinness Larger cities in Southern and Eastern 
Europe; OIA in Western Europe 
Southern and Eastern peripheral 
regions 
Source: own compilation 
 
• Institutionally thick but organisationally thin RIS: Good examples for this type of RIS are 
industrial districts in the Third Italy and regions in the North of Europe. Italian districts are 
well known for a pronounced culture of cooperation (institutional thickness) but they lack 
specific RIS elements such strong research organizations or science-based firms 
(organisational thinness) that are essential for the generation of more radical forms of 
innovation. Nordic peripheral regions benefit from a high quality of government institutions 
(institutional thickness) but are only poorly endowed with innovation relevant organizations 
(organisational thinness). 
 
 
 
• Organisationally thick but institutionally thin RIS: This type of RIS can often be found in 
larger cities in Southern and Eastern Europe but also some old industrial areas in Western 
Europe may fall under this category. These places are characterized by the existence of a 
critical mass of firms as well as research, educational and other supporting organizations 
(organizational thickness). However, innovation activities are seriously curtailed by the 
absence of an innovation and cooperation culture as well as a low quality of government 
institutions (institutional thinness). 
	  
• Institutionally thin and organisationally thin RIS: Such constellations tend to prevail in 
peripheral regions located in the South and East of Europe. More often than not, these areas 
are poorly endowed with innovation-relevant organisations (organisational thinness) and 
suffer from an institutional set-up that is not conducive to innovation (institutional 
thinness). 
 
2.2 Knowledge base approach 
The literature on differentiated knowledge bases (Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Asheim et al., 
2011a) has sharpened our view that all industries and not only high-tech ones can be innovative 
and it has provided the analytical tools for explaining inter-sectorial variations of innovation 
patterns. Three types of knowledge bases can be distinguished: analytical, synthetic and symbolic 
(see Table 3). Scholarly work on knowledge bases clearly challenges old approaches that equate 
innovation with R&D and high-tech activities. Innovation systems that are characterised by lower 
levels of R&D and a dominance of mature industries (that often are knowledge intensive but not 
high-tech) cannot automatically be categorised as less developed ones.  
 
 
Table 3: Differentiated knowledge base approach 
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 Analytical (science 
based): genetics, 
biotech, IT, nanotech. 
Synthetic (engineering 
based): industrial 
machinery, shipbuild.) 
Symbolic (arts based): 
film, TV, design, fashion 
Rationale for 
knowledge 
creation 
Developing new 
knowledge about natural 
systems by applying 
scientific laws 
Applying or combining 
existing knowledge in 
new ways 
Creating meaning, desire, 
aesthetic qualities, affect, 
symbols, images 
Development and 
use of knowledge 
Scientific knowledge, 
models 
Problem solving, custom 
production 
Creative process 
Actors involved Collaboration within and 
between research units 
Interactive learning with 
customers & suppliers 
Experimentations in 
studios, project teams 
Knowledge types Strong codified 
knowledge content, 
highly abstract, universal 
Partially codified 
knowledge, strong tacit 
component, more context 
specific 
Creativity, cultural 
knowledge, sign values; 
strong context specificity 
Importance of 
spatial proximity 
Meaning relatively 
constant between places 
Meaning varies 
substantially between 
places 
Meaning highly variable 
between place, class and 
gender 
Source: Asheim et al. (2011a, p. 898; own modification) 
An analytical knowledge base prevails in research-intensive industries such as biotechnology or 
nanotechnology where innovation is driven by scientific progress. Radically new products and 
processes are developed in a systematic manner involving mainly basic but also applied research. 
Firms usually invest heavily in intramural R&D, but rely also on knowledge generated at 
universities and other research organisations. Linkages between firms and public research 
organisations are thus pivotal and occur more frequently than in other industries. The “science-
technology-innovation” (STI) mode clearly dominates in analytical industries, whilst synthetic 
and symbolic sectors rely more on the “doing-using-interacting” (DUI) mode of innovation (for a 
detailed discussion of the STI and DUI modes of innovation, see Lorenz and Lundvall, 2006; 
Jensen et al., 2007; Asheim, 2012).  
 
A synthetic knowledge base is dominant in mature industries operating in fields such as industrial 
machinery or food processing. Innovation is often more incremental in nature, based on the use 
and new combination of existing knowledge and learning by doing, using and interacting (mainly 
along the value chain, that is, with customers and suppliers). Linkages between university and 
industry are relevant, but occur more in applied research and education, and less in basic 
research.  
 
The symbolic knowledge base is present in creative and cultural industries (advertisement, 
fashion, new media and design). Innovation is devoted to the creation of intangible dimensions 
such as aesthetic value and images. Symbolic knowledge is highly context-specific; the meaning 
and the value associated with it can vary considerably across places. More often than not, 
innovation occurs through experimentations in studios and the formation of temporary project 
teams. 
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A key question that follows from the discussion about knowledge bases concerns the relation 
between RIS configurations and different knowledge types. Arguably, different types of 
knowledge bases require different types of RIS. Asheim and Gertler’s (2005) distinction between 
narrowly defined and broadly defined RIS is eminently important in this regard (Table 4). A 
narrowly defined RIS is constituted by two subsystems and the systemic interaction between them 
to support the STI mode of innovation: the knowledge exploration and diffusion subsystem 
(universities, technical colleges, R&D organizations, technology transfer agencies, business 
associations and finance organisations) and the knowledge exploitation subsystem (firms in 
regional clusters and their support industries). A broadly defined RIS, in contrast, also benefits 
the DUI mode of innovation. It includes the wider setting of organisations and institutions (like a 
specialized labour market that provides experienced workers, applied research centres, non-
R&D-based business services, local technical culture, and so on) that support knowledge 
creation, learning and innovation and their interactions with firms located in the region.  
 
A narrowly defined RIS forms an adequate setting for analytical industries and the STI mode of 
innovation. Although synthetic and symbolic sectors may also benefit from some elements of a 
narrowly defined RIS (in particular applied research), they need a broader defined RIS (a wider 
set of organisations and institutions) that supports the DUI mode of innovation to prosper and 
innovate.  If a RIS is weakly developed (and what specific RIS elements are missing) can thus 
only be determined in relation to knowledge bases and modes of innovation. An innovation 
system can be considered as “less-developed”, if one or more of the above mentioned elements 
are absent or if the existing ones are not “fine-tuned” to the knowledge bases that dominate in the 
region. The theoretical advancement made by the differentiated knowledge base approach and 
insights offered on modes of innovation clearly challenge too “one dimensional” definitions of 
RIS and narrow policy approaches that put too much emphasis on R&D only and ignore other 
important sources of regional innovativeness and competitiveness.   
 
 
Table 4: Knowledge bases and RIS configurations 
Knowledge bases RIS 
Analytical knowledge base (basic research); 
synthetic and symbolic knowledge bases 
(applied research) 
Narrowly defined RIS (linkages between universities; 
R&D institutes, TTOs and firms in the region) 
Synthetic and symbolic knowledge bases Broadly defined RIS (systemic interactions between wider 
system of organisations supporting learning and 
innovation and firms) 
Source: Asheim and Gertler (2005) 
 
 
The approaches discussed above have shed light on various elements and dimensions of RIS that 
may be weak or even missing. They have also allowed for the development of different 
typologies of less-developed RIS and they have led to valuable policy suggestions (see Tödtling 
and Trippl (2005) for policy implications following from RIS failures and Asheim et al. (2011a) 
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as well as Martin and Trippl (2014) for policy conclusions drawn from the knowledge base 
approach).  
 
The RIS concept, however, has also been criticized for providing a rather static perspective. 
Uyarra (2010, p. 129), for instance, notes that many analyses of RIS are “inventory-like 
descriptions of regional systems, with a tendency to focus on a static landscape of actors and 
institutions”. Recent scholarly work, however, has essentially contributed to the development of a 
more dynamic view. Advances in evolutionary economic geography and the literature on related 
variety (Frenken et al. 2007, Boschma and Frenken 2011) and combinations of knowledge bases 
(Asheim et al., 2011a, 2013; Strambach and Klement, 2012) have enhanced our understanding of 
key sources of regional industrial change. Isaksen and Trippl (2014a) integrate RIS in the 
analysis of such change processes and explore conceptually the link between different types of 
RIS and various forms of regional path development (see below). This is highly relevant for the 
purpose of this paper. Regional economies and innovations systems increasingly face the 
challenge to renew their industrial structures and embark on new growth paths. Promotion of 
such regional industrial renewal processes is one of the core aims of smart specialisation 
strategies. 
  
2.3 Regional innovation systems and new path development 
Recent work on regional industrial path development provides important insights into the ways 
regions change over time. This work moves beyond traditional approaches of path dependence, 
which are primarily concerned with illuminating the continuation and persistence of regional 
industrial structures and restrictive lock-ins, and seeks to explain economic renewal and new path 
development in regions. A distinction between three main forms of regional industrial path 
development is drawn (Asheim et al., 2013; Tödtling and Trippl, 2013; Isaksen, 2014; Isaksen 
and Trippl, 2014a). 
 
• Path extension occurs through mainly incremental innovations in existing firms and 
industries. However, such intra-path changes may in the long run lead to stagnation and 
decline due to a lack of renewal (Hassink 2010). Regional industries are then locked into 
innovation activities that take place along existing technological paths limiting their 
opportunities for experimentation and space to manoeuvre into radical innovation. 
Ultimately, this erodes regional competitiveness and can lead to path exhaustion.   
 
• Path renewal takes place when existing firms and industries located in the region switch to 
different but possibly related activities and sectors. This is in line with the notions of 
regional branching and related diversification (Boschma and Frenken, 2011; Boschma, 
2014b) as well as combinatorial knowledge bases and the integration of STI and DUI 
modes of innovation (Jensen et al., 2007; Asheim et al., 2011a, 2013; Manniche, 2012, 
Strambach and Klement, 2012; Grillitsch and Trippl, 2014). 
	  
• New path creation corresponds to unrelated diversification (Boschma, 2014b) as it refers to 
the establishment of firms in entirely new sectors or to the introduction of products new to 
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the market (i.e. radical innovations) (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Tödtling and Trippl, 2013) 
New path creation is often research-driven and requires active policy interventions (Asheim 
et al., 2013) and the creation of supportive institutional structures.  
 
Several scholars have argued that macro-institutional structures have a major influence on 
directions of regional change. Storper (2011) claimed that path renewal is typical for Europe 
whilst the US has a stronger tendency for radical innovations and new path creation. Boschma 
and Capone (2014) provided empirical evidence that national institutions in liberal market 
economies promote unrelated diversification (new path creation) while coordinated market 
economies encourage related diversification (path renewal), as their less flexible institutions do 
not allow them to move in more unrelated fields of activities. However, such tendencies found in 
coordinated market economies can be compensated by strong pro-active policy interventions as is 
seen, for example, in Sweden by VINNOVA’s (Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation 
Systems) centre of expertise policy of building regional innovation systems or strong regional 
research and innovation milieus. This perspective has important implications for the potentials of 
a smart specialisation strategy as well as for how to design and implement such a strategy. 
 
Recent conceptual work that points to varying capacities of regional economies (Boschma, 
2014b) and RIS (Isaksen and Trippl 2014a) to renew their economic structures is highly relevant 
given the purpose of this paper. Boschma (2014b) argues that regions characterized by industrial 
diversity, weak ties and a loosely coherent institutional structure have better chances to develop 
new growth paths. Isaksen and Trippl (2014a) explore the relation between RIS configurations 
and various forms of regional industrial path development. They distinguish between three 
different types of RIS: organizationally thick and diversified systems; organizationally thick and 
specialized systems; and organizationally thin systems. Through a conceptual analysis it is 
demonstrated that these three RIS types differ enormously in their capacity to promote new path 
development (Table 5).  
 
 
 
Table 5: RIS types and regional industrial path development patterns and challenges 
 Characteristics Typical 
development 
patterns 
Weak RIS structures for 
… 
Organizationally 
thick and 
diversified RIS 
Wide range of heterogeneous (but 
related) industries and knowledge 
bases à high potentials for cross-
sectoral knowledge flows & 
recombinations of knowledge; 
strong research organizations à 
high potentials for 
commercializing research; 
bridging (& bonding) social 
capital 
Path renewal and 
new path creation 
… path extension (too little 
exploitation) à lack of 
industrial focus; emerging 
paths may not achieve 
critical mass; instability in 
institutional arrangements 
(fragmentation) 
Organizationally 
thick and 
Narrow industrial base, 
specialized knowledge & support 
Path renewal … switching to new growth 
paths (lack of industrial and 
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specialized RIS structure; bonding (& bridging) 
social capital 
Path extension 
(positive lock-in) 
Path exhaustion 
(negative lock-in) 
organisational variety; too 
little exploration) 
Organizationally 
thin RIS 
Weakly developed clusters, poor 
endowment with knowledge & 
support organizations, bonding 
social capital 
Path exhaustion … new path development 
(lack of critical mass of 
actors, little variety) 
Source: own compilation based on Isaksen and Trippl (2014a) 
 
 
Thick and diversified RIS offer excellent conditions for path renewal and new path creation due 
to the presence of related variety, combinatorial knowledge dynamics, academic entrepreneurship 
and a favourable set-up of knowledge generating organisations. Organisational thick and 
specialized RIS, in contrast, tend to support path extension but face the risk of path exhaustion if 
positive lock-in turns into negative lock-in. However, some RIS belonging to this group benefit 
from a sufficiently large generic competence in their field of specialisation, which may form the 
basis for path renewal processes. Investment into the region’s research infrastructure to 
strengthen and widen the exploration capacity of the RIS can essentially enhance such processes 
(Asheim and Grillitsch, 2014). Path renewal may also be triggered by the inflow of non-local 
knowledge and its combination with the highly specialized assets available within the region. 
Organisationally thin RIS have a limited capacity of promoting path extension and thus they have 
to deal with the danger of path exhaustion (although for different reasons than organisationally 
thick ones).  
 
Both organisationally thick specialised regions and especially organisationally thin regions have 
thus weakly developed RIS structures for supporting new regional industrial path development. 
The main development challenge for these RIS types is to avoid being caught in the “path 
exhaustion trap”. Organisationally thick and diversified regions, in contrast, may suffer from 
weak structures for path extension mainly due to a reduced industrial production (exploitation) 
capacity. A too strong focus on and use of assets and resources for knowledge exploration and 
new path development can lead to a too rapid decrease in knowledge exploitation capacity, 
causing fragmentation problems.  
2.4 Summary 
To summarise, the system failure approach, the notions of organisational and institutional 
thinness, the knowledge base concept as well as recent work on the relation between RIS types 
and new path development offer many insights into what exactly might be less developed in RIS. 
A RIS can be seen as less developed if it is ill equipped to generate innovations along existing 
industrial and technological paths (static view). However, it might also be less developed in the 
sense that it lacks the capacity to support the renewal of the regional economy over time 
(dynamic view). Given the fact that smart specialisation strategies aim at initiating regional 
transformation, it is the latter aspect that should deserve more attention in future research. Key 
issues that remain poorly understood include amongst others the role of exogenous sources 
(external connectedness of regions) of regional change (Isaksen and Trippl, 2014b) and how 
multiscalar institutional frameworks shape path renewal and new path creation (Gertler, 2010). 
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3 Empirical Approaches 
This section takes a closer look at three empirical approaches to measure innovation activities in 
regions and to identify less developed RIS. The approaches selected for a critical examination 
include the Regional Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2014), the Regional 
Innovation Monitor (European Commission, 2013) and the typology of regions suggested by the 
OECD (2011).   
 
3.1 Regional Innovation Scoreboard 
The Regional Innovation Scoreboard provides a comparative assessment of 190 regions within 
the European Union, Norway and Switzerland and is complementary to the Innovation Union 
Scoreboard, which benchmarks innovation performance at the national level. The latest Regional 
Innovation Scoreboard was completed in 2014, using the same methodology as the Innovation 
Union Scoreboard.  Due to problems of data availability, however, it is based on fewer indicators 
(see Table 6). Three main groups of variables with regard to innovation are considered: enablers, 
firm activities and outputs (European Commission, 2014). 
 
In the Innovation Union Scoreboard three types of enablers are covered: human resources; 
research systems; and finance and support. Due to a lack of regional data, they are only 
considered to a limited extent in the Regional Innovation Scoreboard. Only two indicators are 
included, namely ‘percentage of population aged 25-64 having completed tertiary education’ as a 
measure for human resources, and ‘R&D expenditure in the public sector as % of GDP’ as an 
indicator for finance and support. No indicators for measuring the openness and attractiveness of 
research systems are available. Indicators for firm activities are grouped into firm investments, 
linkages & entrepreneurship and intellectual assets. Firm investments are measured by ‘R&D 
expenditures in the business sector as % of GDP’ and by ‘non-R&D innovation expenditures as 
% of turnover’ in SMEs. The latter indicator is based on CIS data and is supposed to indicate the 
diffusion of new production technology and ideas by measuring, for example, investments in 
equipment and machinery or the acquisition of patents and licenses. Data from CIS is also used 
for the two indicators on linkages and entrepreneurship, to measure the share of SMEs that have 
innovated in-house and are involved in innovation co-operation with others. Intellectual assets are 
covered by the number of EPO patent applications in relation to regional GDP.  
 
Table 6: A comparison of the indicators included in the Innovation Union Scoreboard and the Regional 
Innovation Scoreboard (data availability in parenthesis) 
 
 
Innovation Union Scoreboard Regional Innovation Scoreboard 
ENABLERS  
Human Resources  
New doctorate graduates (ISCED 6) per 1000 population 
aged 25-34 
Regional data not available 
Percentage population aged 30-34 having completed tertiary 
education 
Percentage population aged 25-64 having completed tertiary 
education (94.9%) 
Percentage youth aged 20-24 having attained at least upper 
secondary level education 
Regional data not available 
Open, excellent and attractive research systems  
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International scientific co-publications per million 
population 
Regional data not available 
Scientific publications among the top 10% most cited 
publications worldwide as % of total scientific publications 
of the country 
Regional data not available 
Finance and support  
R&D expenditure in the public sector as % of GDP Identical (71.8%) 
Venture capital (early stage, expansion and replacement) as 
% of GDP 
Regional data not available 
FIRM ACTIVITIES  
Firm investments  
R&D expenditure in the business sector as % of GDP Identical (75.1%) 
Non-R&D innovation expenditures as % of turnover Similar (only SMEs) (55.3%) 
Linkages & entrepreneurship  
SMEs innovating in-house as % of SMEs Identical (60.9%) 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others as % of SMEs Identical (64.2%) 
Public-private co-publications per million population Regional data not available 
Intellectual assets  
PCT patent applications per billion GDP (in PPS€) EPO patent applications per billion regional GDP (PPS€) 
(87.6%) 
PCT patent applications in societal challenges per billion 
GDP (in PPS€) 
Regional data not available 
Community trademarks per billion GDP (in PPS€) Regional data not available 
Community designs per billion GDP (in PPS€) Regional data not available 
OUTPUTS  
Innovators  
SMEs introducing product or process innovations as % of 
SMEs 
Identical (64.5%) 
SMEs introducing marketing or organisational innovations 
as % of SMEs 
Identical (63.3%) 
Employment in fast-growing firms of innovative sectors Regional data not available 
Economic effects  
Employment in knowledge-intensive activities 
(manufacturing and services) as % of total employment 
Employment in medium-high/high-tech manufacturing and 
knowledge-intensive services as % of total workforce 
(91.8%) 
Contribution of medium-high and high-tech product exports 
to the trade balance 
Regional data not available 
Knowledge-intensive services exports as % of total service 
exports 
Regional data not available 
Sales of new to market and new to firm innovations as % of 
turnover 
Similar (only SMEs) (49.6%) 
License and patent revenues from abroad as % of GDP Regional data not available 
Source: European Commission (2014, p. 9) 
 
The indicators of innovation outputs aim to measure the innovative outputs of firms (the 
innovators) and the regional effects. Based on CIS data, two indicators are used for measuring the 
performance of innovators: the share of SMEs introducing product or process innovations, and 
the share of SMEs introducing marketing or organisational innovations. As regards economic 
effects, the Regional Innovation Scoreboard considers the share of employment in knowledge-
intensive activities and the sales of new-to-market and new-to-firm innovations in relation to 
turnover. 
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In addition to the lack of regional data for a number of indicators (see Table 6), almost 30% of 
data for the indicators included in the Regional Innovation Scoreboard is missing. For some of 
the indicators, such as ‘sales of new-to-market and new-to-firm innovations’ and ‘non-R&D 
innovation expenditure’, data availability is only around 50%. Furthermore, data availability 
differs between countries. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the availability is 100% 
whilst in Denmark, Croatia and Switzerland it is below 30%. To increase data availability a 
technique for regionalization has been adopted from CIS, followed by a number of imputation 
practices for the remaining missing CIS data and for the indicators using other data (primarily 
Eurostat) (European Commission, 2014).  
 
Using the Regional Innovation Scoreboard, regions in Europe can be categorized in four 
categories based on their relative performance, with thresholds at the same levels as in Innovation 
Union Scoreboard. Innovation Leaders are those regions performing 20% or more above the EU 
average. In the Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2014, these regions have the highest 
performance in all indicators except the share of SMEs involved in innovation co-operation with 
other companies. Among the key strengths of innovation leaders are business activities and 
higher education. Innovation followers are regions at levels between 90% and 120% of the EU 
average. They are performing well on indicators measuring SMEs co-operation in innovation 
activities and share of SMEs innovating in-house but less well on indicators related to the 
performance of their business sector. Moderate innovators are performing between 50% and 
90% of the EU average and modest innovators perform below 50% of the EU average, the latter 
with low scores on all indicators except being equipped with a relatively well-educated 
population (72% of the EU average). 
 
Following the map laid out in Figure 1, we can observe that the regions belonging to the modest 
innovators are largely to be found in the post-socialist transition economies. Others are to be 
found in Croatia and the islands off the Mediterranean coast of Spain. Moderate innovators are 
more broadly distributed across Europe, with significant groupings in the southern member states 
(Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece) the Czech Republic, and parts of Slovakia, Hungary and 
Poland. Furthermore, there are pockets of moderate innovators in countries that generally exhibit 
higher levels of performance, such as northern France (surrounding Ile de France) and Norway. 
 
The features that characterize these modest and moderate innovators vary across regions and 
national context, and we suggest that the patterns illustrated above provide the basis for 
identifying three key categories: first, regions and countries experiencing post-socialist 
transitions; second, regions and countries located in southern Europe; and third, regions 
underperforming in comparison with their surrounding context. 
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Figure 1: Regional performance groups in the Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2014 
 
Regional Innovation Scoreboard 20144
have been published in 2002, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 
2012. The RIS 2014 provides both an update of the 
RIS 2012 but also introduces some changes in the 
measurement methodology.
Regional performance groups
Similar as in the IUS where countries are classified into 
4 different innovation performance groups, Europe’s 
regions have also been classified into Regional Innovation 
leaders (34 regions), Regional Innovation followers 
(57 regions), Regional Moderate innovators (68 regions) 
and Regional Modest innovators (31  regions).
This 6th edition of the Regional Innovation Scoreboard 
(RIS) provides a comparative assessment of innovation 
performance across 190 regions of the European Union, 
Norway and Switzerland. The RIS accompanies the 
Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) which benchmarks 
innovation performance at the level of Member States.
Where the IUS provides an annual benchmark of 
Member States’ innovation performance, regional 
innovation benchmarks are less frequent and less 
detailed due to a general lack of innovation data at 
the regional level. The Regional Innovation Scoreboard 
addresses this gap and provides statistical facts on 
regions’ innovation performance. Previous RIS reports 
Executive summary
Map created with Region Map Generator
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2014, p. 16 
 
 
In a comparison of the initial performance levels and the change in performance between 2004 
and 2010 for all regions in the Regional Innovation Scoreboard, no ‘catching-up’ processes can 
be observed. Less-performing regions are not growing faster than well-performing ones during 
this time period. However, most regions have improved their innovation performance during the 
observation period. In regions located in southern Europe and regions underperforming in 
comparison with their surrounding context, a decrease in innovation performance is seen in some 
regions such as the east coast of Spain, but the main pattern is that innovation performance is 
increasing. In regions experiencing post-socialist transitions innovation performance growth is 
more divergent, most notably with groups of decreasing regions in Eastern Poland, Croatia and 
Western Romania. Here we have a number of less-performing regions experiencing a relative 
decline of innovation performance over time. 
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The Regional Innovation Scoreboard suffers from several shortcomings. As already mentioned 
above, it is based on a rather low number of indicators and data is missing for many regions. For 
some indicators, survey data is used, whilst others are based on register data. Another problem is 
that the Regional Innovation Scoreboard sometimes corresponds to NUTS1 and sometimes to 
NUTS2 regions. Among the indicators in the Regional Innovation Scoreboard, there is a bias 
towards measuring R&D-driven innovation activities and even though non-R&D activities are 
targeted (for example through non-R&D expenditure as % of turnover in SMEs), it remains 
obscure what is covered in this regard. Whilst some indicators are broad and can include a wide 
variety of innovations, most are more narrow and targeted towards measuring analytical 
knowledge, the STI mode of innovation and narrowly defined RIS. Neither does the Regional 
Innovation Scoreboard consider the degree of regional specialisation, neglecting, for instance, the 
possible dependence of regions on an industrial mono-structure, fragmentation problems or a lack 
of positive lock-ins. Thus, it fails to identify what system failures or system deficiencies are 
prevailing in the region. Moreover, it does not offer insights into problems of organisational and 
institutional thinness, nor does it capture the capacity of regions to support regional industrial 
change. 
 
 
3.2 Regional Innovation Monitor 
The Regional Innovation Monitor (RIM) provides information on regional innovation policies for 
20 EU Member States2. The aim is to provide intelligence on innovation policies in some 200 
regions across these member states, and to offer easy access and a comparative overview of 
regional innovation policies. Information and analysis of policy documents, governance 
structures and existing innovation policy initiatives are collected at NUTS1 and NUTS2 levels. 
The RIM repository gives a comprehensive overview of the state of development of regional 
innovation policies and strategies as well as the state of the implementation of these, in all 200 
regions. In addition to this, 80 in-depth regional reports (RIM Plus) have been prepared since 
2011 (European Commission, 2013). 
 
In these in-depth regional reports, the focus is on identifying areas for improvement or challenges 
in the RIS, regardless of the regions’ innovation performance. The policy governance and policy 
instruments are analysed and conclusions for future policy making are drawn. Through 
qualitative analyses the RIM Plus reports seek to provide insights into how to address the 
prevailing challenges in the region. However, they do not provide a clear-cut way of identifying 
less-developed RIS. 
 
Each region in the RIM repository has been categorized in one of three categories: world-class 
performers, regions with strong focus on industrial employment and regions with a focus on the 
service sector and public R&D. The classification has been made using the regional distribution 
of employment and R&D expenditure. If these categories are related to the Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard (see above), we find that a majority of world-class performers are labelled innovation 
leaders in the scoreboard. About two thirds of the regions that have been classified as modest and 
moderate innovators in the scoreboard, are categorised as regions with strong focus on industrial 
employment in the RIM analyses (European Commission, 2013). In summary, the RIM focuses 
                                                
2 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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primarily on the policy and governance dimension of RIS. It could be used as a tool for 
identifying what deficiencies, especially with regard to the policy subsystem, are dominant in 
less-developed regions. 
 
3.3 OECD approach 
By using data from the OECD Regional Database, Ajmone Marsan and Maguire (2011) suggest a 
categorisation of regions with the aim of capturing the regional socio-economic and production 
structure as well as variables associated with innovation activities. This is the approach used to 
categorise regions in the report “Regions and Innovation Policy” (OECD 2011). Based on the 
availability of data in the OECD Regional Database, twelve variables are selected to reflect the 
regional socio-economic structure, industrial structure and some input- and output-indicators 
“commonly associated with an innovation-friendly environment” (Ajmone Marsan and Maguire, 
2011, p. 11). When selecting variables, there was a trade-off between the breadth of variables and 
the number of countries with available data, in an effort to maximise the number of regions for 
the analysis3. Three broad categories are identified and are divided into eight sub-categories (see 
Table 7). A majority of regions (60%) were identified as industrial production zones, 
characterized by an industrial structure that faces specific challenges for restructuring and 
transformation. The highest wealth levels and best performance on science- and technology based 
innovation-related indicators are found in the knowledge hubs, constituting 15% of all regions. 
Finally, 24% of all regions are non-S&T-driven regions, sharing a peripheral location and are 
lacking knowledge absorption and generation capacity to keep up with other OECD regions. 
	  
Table 7: Variables and categorisation of OECD regions 
	  
Sources: Ajmone Marsan and Maguire (2011), OECD (2011) 
 
                                                
3 All OECD countries except Australia, Chile, Estonia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New Zeeland, Turkey, 
Slovenia and Switzerland are included in the analysis. 
Variables (Ajmone Marsan and Maguire (2011)    Categorization of OECD regions (OECD 2011) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita  Knowledge hubs (38 regions) 
Population Density  Knowledge intensive city/capital districts 
Unemployment Rate  Knowledge and technology hubs 
Percentage of the labour force with tertiary 
education 
 Industrial production zones (145 regions) 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as share of 
GDP 
 US states with average S&T performance 
Business R&D expenditure as a share of total 
R&D expenditure 
 Service and natural resource regions in knowledge-
intensive countries 
PCT patent applications per million inhabitants  Medium-tech manufacturing and service providers 
Share of employment in the primary sector  Traditional manufacturing regions 
Share of employment in the public sector  Non-S&T-driven regions (57 regions) 
Share of employment in manufacturing  Structural inertia or de-industrialising regions 
High & medium-high technology manufacturing 
as a & of total manufacturing 
 Primary-sector-intensive regions 
Knowledge-intensive services as % of total 
services 
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The non-S&T-driven regions are divided into ‘structural inertia or de-industrialising regions’ and 
‘primary-sector-intensive regions’ and account for only 8% of the sample GDP (compared to 
14% of the population). These are regions that face processes of de-industrialisation or 
experience structural inertia and regions with a significant share of their economies in primary 
sector activities or low-technology manufacturing, located across primarily Eastern and Southern 
Europe. The primary-sector-intensive regions are lagging behind all other groups, in terms of 
GDP per capita and innovation-related indicators. As seen in Figure 2, these regions largely 
correspond to regions experiencing post-socialist transitions and regions in southern Europe and 
are considered by Ajmone Marsan and Maguire (2011) to capture the peripheral economies in 
Europe. However, with the exception of two regions in southern France, no regions 
underperforming compared to their surrounding context are found. This probably relates to the 
methodology used, measuring the industrial structure by the share of employment in broad 
sectoral terms (primary, public, manufacturing and service sectors), leading to a spatial clustering 
of regions within the same category. 
 
 
Figure 2: Structural inertia or de-industrialising regions (left) and primary-sector-intensive regions (right)  
 
 
Source: Ajmone Marsan and Maguire (2011, pp. 25-26), own modification 
 
The indicators proposed by Ajmone Marsan and Maguire (2011) are useful for identifying 
regions with weak economic structures as well as weak innovation capabilities. Measurement of 
innovation is, however, restricted to variables such as R&D and patenting intensity that may 
capture activities in analytical sectors and the STI mode of innovation but are inadequate to 
assess the performance of other knowledge bases, innovation modes and broadly defined RIS 
(see below). Furthermore, these indicators are mainly targeting the current economic state of the 
region and, as the authors themselves acknowledge, are lacking a dynamic dimension. The 
OECD typology do not consider what factors are determining the transformative capacity of a 
RIS, or what factors are resulting in a lack of such capacity. Moreover, as already stated above, 
the indicators used in the OECD typology approach to proxy the innovation environment are 
mainly measuring analytical knowledge and narrowly defined RIS. Neither do they cover the 
degree of specialisation in the regional industrial structure. In addition, even though non-S&T-
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driven regions are identified as less-performing regions, the OECD approach does not take into 
consideration the heterogeneity existing within this group. This issue is also seen in the case with 
regions categorised as industrial production zones, where this approach acknowledges that these 
regions are facing challenges for restructuring and transformation but treats these challenges as 
specificities to each region, failing to provide insights into more general innovation and 
transformation problems that might curtail development in these regions. 
 
4 Conclusions and Outlook 
The critical review and discussion of conceptual and empirical approaches to identify less-
developed RIS has shed light on a large number and variety of barriers and weaknesses that may 
curtail innovation and regional industrial change. The RIS concept offers many insights in this 
regard and allows for the development of useful typologies of less-developed RIS that are highly 
relevant for the current debate on the design and implementation of smart specialisation 
strategies.  
 
There are several challenges for future research. First, future conceptual research should further 
advance our understanding of opportunities and challenges for regional industrial change in 
different types of RIS. Recent work on the relation between RIS configurations and new path 
development has made an important contribution in this regard. The focus has thus far been on 
how the degree of organisational thickness and the degree of specialisation of industrial structures 
shape the direction of regional industrial change. The institutional dimension of RIS has received 
less attention in this work. A key issue of future research is thus to explore how institutions at 
various spatial scales and institutional change affect new path development in different RIS 
types. Another core question that deserves due attention in future work concerns the role of 
exogenous sources of regional industrial change. New path development has thus far been 
conceptualised as a process that builds on endogenous assets. The role of global innovation 
networks and other forms of exogenous development impulses (and their interplay with locally 
available knowledge) have been underplayed in the literature and remain poorly understood. 
There is thus a need for systematic analyses of how extra-regional knowledge flows and external 
connectedness affect the extension, renewal and creation of regional industrial paths. Third, little 
is known about the nexus between RIS transformation and regional industrial change. Future 
research should thus address the question of how various RIS types transform themselves as a 
result of path renewal and new path creation. 
 
Second, existing empirical approaches fall short of taking account of conceptual insights into 
system failures, organisational and institutional thinness, misconfigurations of RIS in relation to 
knowledge bases and weak RIS structures for different forms of path development. In other 
words: advances that have been made in conceptual debates on specificities of less-developed 
regions are only partly reflected in existing empirical approaches. There is still a tendency to 
measure narrowly defined RIS, analytical (R&D based) knowledge and the STI mode of 
innovation and build typologies based on the findings of these exercises. There is a need to 
consider in particular recent findings on the role of different types of knowledge bases and 
innovation modes (as well as their combination) and broadly defined RIS in empirical research 
that aims at revealing misconfigurations of RIS. In addition, the transformative potential of RIS, 
that is, their capacity to support new path development, is hardly captured. There is a need for 
 23 
developing new measures and indicators to be used in quantitative research as well as new 
designs for qualitative case studies that take into consideration the issues raised above. Building 
on the analytical insights provided in this working paper, current research in the context of the 
project “Smart specialisation for regional innovation” could make a valuable contribution to 
enhance understanding of how diversified specialisation or specialised diversification can be 
achieved among the heterogeneity of European regions. 
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3. Challenges and opportunities facing regions with less developed research 
and innovation systems - the role of economic structure: the global production 
networks perspective   
 
Introduction  
 
It has been argued in the Reflection paper that economies of regions with less developed research 
and innovation systems can be characterised by the following triad of key weaknesses of their 
economic structure. First, by widely prevalent branch-plant syndrome (this issue has been already 
extensively covered by the literature on trans-national corporations and on FDIs including 
investigations of their spillovers and impacts - see for example, Massey, 1984, Dunning, Lundan, 
2008, Pavlínek, Žížalová, 2014, Pavlínek et al 2009). Second, these regions are typical by weak 
endogenous SMEs sector (this issue is also frequent in the literature, but often lacks proper 
theoretical framework). The third feature of these regions is locking-in of a sizeable part of 
companies in these regions as the lower-tier suppliers of global production networks/global value 
chains (GPNs/GVCs). These studies are generally well-embedded into sound and still advancing 
theoretical framework (e.g. Ernst and Kim, 2002, Gereffi et al, 2005, Coe et al, 2008, Barrientos 
et al, 2011), but much less attention is being paid to a normative side, i.e. to possible policy 
implications (for exceptions see Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002, Humphrey, 2006). However, even 
these studies focus predominately upon challenges stemming for local firms from GVC/GPN 
perspective from the angle of developing countries. Consequently, all three above-mentioned 
features translate themselves into limited internal connectivity among regional actors (firms, 
R&D institutions, various intermediary bodies etc.) which represents – in line with the theory of 
regional innovation systems (Cooke, 2004) – one of the principal bottlenecks for development of 
these regions (Tödtling, Trippl, 2005, Tödtling and Trippl, 2013).    
 
Therefore, the aim of this research paper is to make an attempt to advance the discussion about 
the evolutionary dynamics of actors engaged in GPNs with the ultimate aim to stimulate 
discussion about possible policy implications for European regions with less developed research 
and innovations systems. This should be achieved by an attempt to develop a typology of 
functional upgrading and of downgrading. Consequently, it will be argued that acknowledging 
different types of functional downgrading – arguably the most desirable type of upgrading – and 
of different types of downgrading, each inducing different challenges but also offering different 
opportunities would contribute not only to enhancing understanding of multiplicity of 
evolutionary trajectories of suppliers integrated in GPNs, but would also open the space for 
developing of much more targeted policy interventions.   
 
 
Regions with less developed research and innovation systems – a global production network 
perspective  
 
Over the last 20 years has been proceeding a vigorous debate on the role of GPNs/GVCs in 
current globalised economy (Gereffi, 1999, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002, 2004, Henderson et al, 
2002, Cattaneo et al, 2010, Barrientos et al, 2011, Sturgeon et al, 2008). The research helped to 
unravel various modalities of governance of these networks or chains (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002, 2004, Gereffi et al, 2005) and later even their evolutionary dynamics (Patel-Campillo, 
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2010, MacKinnon, 2011, Ponte, 2014). Scholars identified various mechanisms and processes 
integrating particular GPNs/GVCs such as various types of strategic coupling, resp. decoupling 
and recoupling (Yeung, 2009, resp. Horner, 2013) as well as analysed interrelations of these 
economic meta-structures to host of other actors such as governments, regulators, trade unions, 
NGOs, etc.(Ponte, 2014).  
 
The theory of global production networks is a powerful tool for i) understanding of the changing 
economic geography of the world (Gereffi, 1999), and ii) for understanding the challenges facing 
the firms, which are integrated into these networks/chains (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004, 
Humphrey, 2006). Key argument of GPNs/GVCs approach is that sizeable part of world's 
production is organized by large enterprises, which command the networks/chains of suppliers of 
different tiers and these networks are governed by different modes of governance, which are 
differentiated not only among particular GPNs (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004), but even within 
them (Isaksen, Kalsaas, 2009). Therefore, global production networks are mostly commanded by 
lead firms, which are usually large transnational corporations leading the market “in terms of 
their brand names, technology, products/services, and marketing capabilities” (Yeung, 2009, p. 
330). However, due to managerial reasons, the lead firms are directly dealing only with a limited 
number of first-tier suppliers, which are providing them with key components or most 
sophisticated (sub)systems, even though this is not a universal model of governance (see 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). First-tier suppliers (often also large transnational corporations) 
then command their own suppliers of a second- or third-tier.  
 
Obviously, in reality, various modalities of governance strategies can be found. For example, lead 
firms within the automotive sector employ not only contrasting strategies to penetrate new 
markets, but also sharply different modes of governance of their GPN/GVC (Sturgeon et al, 2008, 
Glogar, 2013). The varying governance strategies of lead firms concern not only external 
suppliers, but even branch-plants in their possession (Glogar, 2013). Importantly, among firms 
and other actors integrated into GPNs proceed intensive mutual links and learning, which are 
often spanning the regional and national borders (Pavlínek, Žížalová, 2014). Among the 
examples of benefits emanating from engagement in GPNs are improvement of management and 
logistics methods and systems, improvements of technology standards, including the systems for 
quality control, cooperation in the sphere of R&D etc. (Isaksen, Kalsaas, 2009). Therefore, 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2004) even explicitly talk about “tutoring role” of buyers.  
 
Importantly, each stratum of suppliers within GPNs/GVCs commands its own advantages but 
also disadvantages. In particular, the third-tier suppliers, which represent the most frequent type 
of suppliers in regions with less developed research and innovations systems (Csank, 2012) have 
guaranteed demand (often in large volume) for standard goods produced on a well-known 
technology, and obviously, do not have to bother with market research.  
 
On the other hand, three-tier suppliers are exposed to tremendous cost pressure and are operating 
under permanent threat of being replaced by cheaper suppliers (e.g. from the Far East, see 
Humphrey, Schmitz, 2004). Evidently, the cost pressure is not unique to third-tier suppliers, 
nevertheless, according to Glogar (2013), the specific situation of these suppliers (often local 
SMEs) stems from the fact that they are frequently squeezed in-between large suppliers both 
from “above” (i.e. from higher-tier suppliers) and from “below” (i.e. from large firms, which are 
supplying them with the basic production materials such as various metals, plastic granule, 
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energy etc.). Therefore, bargaining power (and hence, the profit margin) of these lower-tier 
suppliers is really limited. According to some evidence, the profit margin of lower-tier suppliers 
often varies between 3-5%4.    
 
However, much more important is the fact that these third-tier suppliers are charged with 
production of large quantities of standardized goods produced on a well-known technology. 
Consequently, these firms are not expected to come with any sort of innovation except for cost-
saving measures (i.e. “process upgrading”) (Csank, 2010). Therefore, even if these third-tier 
suppliers are integrated into GPNs orchestrated by high-tech (or medium-tech) lead firms, and 
even in case there is nearby a research institution (e.g. a university) focused on the potentially 
relevant topic, the space for mutual cooperation between research institution and the firm as 
envisaged by triple helix or regional innovation systems theory is fairly limited. Consequently, 
given narrow profit margins of these lower-tier suppliers as well as provided their limited 
prospects stemming from their low-road competitive strategy, the concept of upgrading is of key 
relevance for these firms.  
 
However, while there is a vast amount of literature on various aspects of GPNs/GVCs in both 
highly developed and developing countries, there is only limited number of studies applying 
these theories to less developed European countries and regions, such as those in  Southern 
Europe or in the former command economies (for exceptions, see e.g. Pavlínek, Ženka, 2011, 
Smith et al, 2008). Nevertheless, even more limited is the number of studies, which would be 
exploring various types of upgrading in case of firms located in less developed European regions 
and, especially, which would be deriving potential policy implications. Likewise, according to 
available knowledge, there is just a single article dealing with complexities of upgrading in case 
of firms nested in highly developed country (Isaksen, Kalsaas, 2009 on the case of Norway). 
Nevertheless, while this article succeeded in a provision of a detailed anatomy of upgrading in 
the case of particular company, it did not forward specific policy implications. Consequently, in 
the literature, there is considerable gap, which closing is, moreover, offering huge potential for 
design of supportive policies.  
 
However, what is clear from the existing research, is the fact that there exists a variety of types of 
governance of these global production networks from quasi-hierarchical (or captive) to network 
(or modular) each offering different opportunities for upgrading - see e.g. Gereffi, et al (2005) or 
Humphrey, Schmitz (2002). The type of governance varies not only among different GPNs 
within the same industry (Glogar, 2013), but even among particular firms integrated within the 
same GPN (Isaksen, Kalsaas, 2009). In addition, Ponte (2014) argued persuasively that while 
much of the existing literature has conceived GPNs as unipolar governance systems (i.e. driven 
by lead firms) and only few scholars moved to bipolar conceptualisation of GPNs, Ponte 
suggested to reconceptualise GPNs´ governance as a continuum between unipolarity and 
multipolarity. Multipolar conception of governance of GPNs proved helpful in explanation of 
evolutionary dynamics of GPNs and, especially, for taking-in strategic actions of powerful actors 
outside the chain such as governments, standard developers, international NGOs, certification 
agencies, labour unions, consumer associations (Ponte, 2014).  
 
                                                
4 These data were provided during a meeting with entrepreneurs, which was held in Prague in December 2013 in 
conjunction with a drafting of the Czech smart specialisation strategy.   
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Moreover, recently, it was shown, how the power asymmetry within the GPN can be not only 
moderated, but even completely reversed by a joint action of firms and the regulator (Patel-
Campillo, 2010). Moreover, Isaksen and Kalsaas (2009) have recently shown that the power 
asymmetry between the lead firm and its suppliers may change even during the production phase 
of a given product. Namely, while during the phase of product development the relationship can 
be characterised as network, during the production phase the governance shifts to quasi-hierarchy 
mode, when the lead firms for example requires open-book approach concerning the cost-
structure during the negotiation of contracts (Isaksen, Kalsaas, 2009). All these examples 
pervasively show that the existing power asymmetry should not be considered as a pre-given and 
ever-lasting, but rather as a point of departure. From this observation follows an important 
argument. In particular, it can be expected that if firms would be able to pursue a suitable 
upgrading strategy and provided that companies would be supported in their efforts by a targeted 
public intervention, there is a reasonable chance that limitations following from unfavourable 
mode of their integration into GPNs can be overcome. Hence, the issue of upgrading comes to the 
forefront.  
 
Even more surprising gap in current understanding of challenges of regions with less developed 
research and innovation systems is the fact that there is no information available about the extent 
and type of integration of particular regional economies into different types of GPNs (according 
to governance structure, type of production (high-/medium-/low-tech), country of origin, and, 
most importantly, the structure of suppliers according to tiers etc.). According to the best of our 
knowledge, there is only one study, which authors at least tried to estimate the extent to which a 
particular economy is engaged in GPNs (Novotný et al, 2014). On the case of the Czech economy 
they estimated that up to 75% of the value added by manufacturing industry is produced by firms 
integrated into GPNs. Even though investigation of the extent to which particular national and 
regional economies are incorporated into GPNs is beyond this smart specialisation project, the 
information about the scale and type of integration of particular regional economies at least into 
basic types of GPNs would represent a significant advancement of existing knowledge, 
moreover, with important policy implications. Without such knowledge, the strategies and 
policies are running a substantial risk of being misguided. Likewise, innovation strategies on both 
national and regional levels would be much more realistic if understanding of the different forms 
of upgrading (and their preconditions) would be enhanced.    
 
While these gaps in understanding of the role of GPNs and of particular challenges and 
opportunities of various suppliers are hindering comprehension of innovation strategies across 
various regions, this lack of knowledge is particularly painful in case of the former command 
economies in Central Eastern Europe. This is due to lock-in of a sizeable part of theses 
economies within the lowest tiers of GPNs due to their specific evolutionary path, which will be 
briefly outlined in the next paragraph. 
 
In particular, the collapse of state-socialism in Central Eastern Europe, and subsequent economic 
transformation resulted inter alia in fundamental alteration of evolutionary trajectories of the 
former stated-owned companies, but impinged also upon the opportunities of newly established 
private firms. First, the existing original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), which were shielded 
against competition by the command economy and by restrictions of foreign trade, suddenly, 
after the economic liberalisation, become uncompetitive. Subsequently, they were privatized and 
the new owners were searching for a possible survival strategy. One of these strategies have been 
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to narrow the production portfolio to products (often components) where the firm felt itself most 
competitive. Therefore, instead of production for end market, these firms shifted their production 
towards particular components. Such a strategy has been frequent for example in electro-technic 
industry (Csank, 2012). From GPNs/GVCs perspective, such a process represents a sort of 
economic downgrading. Second, numerous suppliers of components (for example, for the 
automotive industry) faced a challenge to enhance the quality of production significantly, while 
keeping the cost at the same level. This was often achieved by a combination of process and 
product upgrading. Obviously, numerous suppliers were not able to sustain the market pressure 
and were forced either into bankruptcy or to switch into a new – often less sophisticated – market 
segment. In contrast, number of cases when the firm was able to shift towards the activities with 
higher value added was severely limited (Pavlínek, Ženka, 2011). Third, in many cases, the 
newly established firms have been lured by a strong demand for simple components emanating 
from foreign firms (located either in abroad or operating in a given country). This demand, 
according to Csank (2010), represented a sort of “low-hanging fruit”, i.e. a relatively easy 
business model based on those days low-cost advantage. However, this model proved to be 
hardly sustainable due to rising input costs as well as due to growth of production capabilities and 
resulting sharp competition from newly industrialized countries. 
 
Therefore, despite certain variations in their evolutionary paths, one of important transversal 
features of a large number of European regions with less developed research and innovation 
system in Southern Europe, but especially in Central and Eastern Europe, is the fact that an 
important segment of their economies is formed by local firms operating as lower-tier suppliers 
to various global production networks.  
 
Consequently, in case of regions, which economic structure is densely dotted with third-and 
second-tier suppliers, the concept of upgrading is of key relevance. For that reason, the next 
section will be devoted to concepts of upgrading and downgrading, which constitute key 
processes of internal evolutionary dynamics of global production networks.   
 
Upgrading and downgrading – the evolutionary dynamics within the global production 
networks 
 
In this section, effort will be made to enrich the discussion on concepts of economic upgrading as 
well as on downgrading. This discussion would emphasise the internal evolutionary dynamics of 
GPNs and underline the multiplicity of potential strategies of firms engaged in GPNs. Therefore, 
first, established types of upgrading will be briefly introduced. Second, several types of 
functional upgrading (arguably the most desirable type of upgrading as it is closely related to 
distribution of gains from globalisation - see Humphrey, Schmitz, 2004) will be distinguished and 
argued that each type offers different opportunities for the firms concerned. Third, relevance of 
particular types of upgrading according to a position of a given firm within the GPN hierarchy 
will be scrutinized. Fourth, a special attention will be paid to downgrading, which has so far 
remained rather under-researched. In particular, several types of downgrading will be 
distinguished and argued that one-sided negative connotation of this concept should be avoided.  
 
Upgrading has been recently briefly defined as a shift „to higher value added activities in 
production, to improve technology, knowledge and skills, and to increase the benefits or profits 
deriving from participation in GPNs“ (Barrientos et al, 2011, p. 323). Upgrading is one of key 
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concepts firmly established within GVC/GPN framework, and, so far, several different types of 
upgrading have been introduced. Three types of upgrading achieved nearly general acceptation 
by the GPNs/GVCs researchers. These are: i) process upgrading representing esp. various cost-
saving measures to enhance efficiency of production, ii) product upgrading, which is achieved by 
manufacturing of more sophisticated products, and iii) functional upgrading – a shift towards the 
activities with higher value added such as developing own brand or abandoning existing lower-
level functions (Humphrey, Schmitz, 2004). However, while process as well as product 
upgrading has been documented as frequent by the GVC/GPN research, there is less agreement in 
the literature upon a prevalence of functional upgrading as it might be constrained by buyers´ 
resistance eager to protect their core competence as well as by resource requirements and 
associated risks (ibid.).    
 
In addition, several other types of economic upgrading have been identified in the literature as 
well. In particular, intersectoral upgrading occurs in case the firm is using its technology and 
know-how gained due to its engagement within the GPN for production of goods for end market 
where the company is able to enjoy higher profit margin (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). In 
contrast, (inter)chain upgrading, represents a shift to another GPN, where the firm can reach 
better and/or higher position for example in case the GPN is more technologically advanced 
and/or is oriented upon production for higher status buyers (Barrientos et al, 2011). Needless to 
say, however, that chain upgrading is by some authors considered as more or less identical to 
intersectoral upgrading (Rabellotti, 2014). Moreover, chain upgrading as evolutionary process 
from low end market to more sophisticated market segments (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004) has 
been called organizational succession by Gereffi (1999). Importantly, organizational succession 
can apply not only to individual firms, but even to the whole GPN in case the whole network is 
able to move to higher market segment or to a more sophisticated production. (Automaker Škoda 
can be a good example of such a case as it was able to shift from lower to medium market 
segment over the last approximately 15 years). A special sort of upgrading strategy can be short-
term strategic decoupling and subsequent recoupling in case the detrimental effects of 
engagement in GPN outweigh the contribution to value creation (Horner, 2013). In that case, 
strategic decoupling can be considered as “a temporary and sequential strategy to improve value 
creation, enhancement and capture for development objectives, and may be followed by 
recoupling with the same or, usually, other GPNs.” (Horner, 2013, p. 5-6). Finally, a particular 
type of upgrading has been provided by Patel-Campillo (2010), who analysed intriguing  
evolutionary trajectory of the Dutch cut flower agro-industry from buyer-driven to producer-
driven chain achieved by coordinated endeavour of flower growers and of the government.   
 
Towards the typology of functional upgrading  
 
Functional upgrading is considered as one of the most desirable, yet, especially in quasi-
hierarchical GPNs, most challenging type of upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004, Isaksen, 
Kalsaas, 2009). Therefore, unsurprisingly, there is a controversy among the experts upon the 
extent to which prospects for functional upgrading can be turned into practice (Humphrey, 
Schmitz, 2004). Obviously, possibilities for functional upgrading are conditioned by a 
multiplicity of factors (type of governance, capabilities and ambition of the supplier concerned, 
the quality of national and regional innovation system in which the particular company is 
embedded, etc., see Humphrey, Schmitz, 2004). Nevertheless, one of key arguments of this paper 
is that the discussion on functional upgrading can be further enhanced by a more nuanced 
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approach towards this type of upgrading. Consequently, in addition to existing types of 
upgrading, several types of functional upgrading should be distinguished (see Table 1), differing 
in their plausibility as well as differing in their potential benefits (Table 2).  
 
Table 1: Overview of types of upgrading options/strategies  
 
Type of upgrading Rationale Example 
Process upgrading  Cost-saving measures such as fine-tuning of 
technology, energy-saving measures, economising 
labour-costs etc 
Common 
Product upgrading Developing new products with higher value for 
customers, however, new product can be developed 
often only upon a request of a lead firm (or higher- tier 
supplier).  
Common 
 Functional 
upgrading  
 
- voluntary 
transfer of some 
high value-added 
functions by 
higher-tier firm 
Transfer of higher-level function(s) can occur e.g. due 
to limited R&D capacities of a lead firm or higher-tier 
supplier, due cost considerations or due to cultural 
reasons. 
Firm EGE has 
been charged 
with 
development 
of a 
technological 
subsystem as 
the lead firm 
narrowed its 
R&D effort 
only upon the 
key 
technological 
system.  
- replacement of 
the higher-tier 
supplier  
Unreliability, high-cost or limited innovation 
capabilities of existing higher-level supplier. 
Infrequent  
- developing new 
market   
Identification and opening-up of a new market (e.g. 
integration of parking cameras into locking systems of 
cars) 
Brano-parking 
cameras 
integrated 
within locks 
- attraction of 
higher tier supplier 
into the region 
Improved possibilities for employment of highly 
qualified workers including R&D employees, transfer 
of know-how, multiplier effect on endogenous lower-
tier suppliers. 
1. tiers 
suppliers 
followed new 
investment by 
Hyundai  
Inter-sectoral 
upgrading  
(or even inter-
sectoral shift) 
Using know-how gained during production within GPN 
for manufacturing of own goods for final market. Inter-
sectoral upgrading may eventually even lead to 
decoupling from GPN and a complete shift of 
production portfolio towards final market.  
Firm PBS 
(aircraft 
industry) is 
capable of 
developing 
special 
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appliances for 
final 
customers with 
much wider 
profit margins.  
(Inter)chain 
upgrading 
(organisational 
succession – firm 
level) 
A shift of a supplier to upper segments of the market 
offering larger profit margins  
Czech 
automotive 
suppliers 
(Pavlínek, 
Ženka, 2011).     
Chain upgrading 
(organisational 
succession – the 
level of the whole 
GPN) 
Gradual shift of the whole GPN towards upper 
segments of the market offering larger profit margins. 
Škoda, 
Hyundai, 
HTC.  
Reversion of 
power hierarchy 
from buyer- driven 
to producer-driven 
GPN  
Capturing a larger share of value created by 
transformation of buyer-driven to producer-driven 
GPN. 
Dutch cut 
flowers 
producers 
(Patel-
Campillo 
2011).  
Strategic 
decoupling (and 
eventual 
recoupling)   
Developing production and technology capabilities and 
thus capturing a larger share of value created.  
Case of Indian 
pharmaceutical 
industry 
(Horner, 
2013). 
Source: Blažek (2015)  
 
From a supplier perspective, three types of functional upgrading might be identified. Therefore, 
the first type of functional upgrading can be defined/conceived as a replacement of existing 
higher-tier supplier by a lower-tier supplier. Nevertheless, this option is not only rather unlikely, 
but, even more importantly, such an option would offer only severely limited benefits for a new 
supplier as the attempt to replace the established higher-tier supplier would result in a fierce 
competition and the alternative supplier should offer significantly better conditions than the 
existing supplier (Glogar, 2013). In consequence, the potential profit margin for the new supplier 
is likely to be less than modest and, therefore, this type of functional upgrading is probably the 
least desirable one.    
 
However, there are two other, much more favourable types of functional upgrading. In particular, 
the second type of functional upgrading might occur in case that the lead firm or higher-tier 
supplier would voluntarily transfer some higher value added functions, for example development 
and/or production of some sophisticated technical (sub)system to its lower-tier supplier. Four 
main motives for such a transfer might be contemplated. Firstly, the major impetus for such 
voluntary transfer of higher-level functions could be provided by the lack of own technical 
capacities of higher-tier supplier given the increasing global competition and shortening of the 
production cycle (Duchêne et al, 2013). These pressures may force the higher-tier supplier to 
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focus upon the development of the core technology and to transfer the development of linked 
technical (sub)systems to another company. The second reason for voluntary transfer of some 
higher level functions can be a shift of higher-tier supplier to still higher position within GPN 
(e.g. to a Tier 0.5 supplier –see Pavlínek, Žížalová, 2014) or even an establishment of its own 
brand (OBM) and consequent move to high value added downstream activities such as branding, 
marketing and customer services (Rabellotti,2014). This accords with observation by Yeung 
(2009), who identified a trend of lead firms “towards market control via product and market 
definitions, rather than leadership in manufacturing processes and technologies” (p. 330). The 
third motive for such a voluntary transfer might be the cost-considerations as the new supplier 
could, esp. in case that it is located in a less developed region with lower price level, offer lesser 
price. Finally, the voluntary transfer of some higher level functions can be induced by cultural 
differences between the country of origin of a lead firm and the network of its suppliers located in 
a different continent (Glogar, 2013).   
   
Practical experience of the authors shows that this can be quite realistic and, therefore, relatively 
frequent type of functional upgrading, provided that the lower-tier supplier commands sufficient 
capacities and capabilities, and, ideally, is embedded within supportive institutional framework. 
This type of functional upgrading might be highly beneficial for the company concerned as it 
would result in improving its production as well as technological capabilities (Pavlínek, Žížalová, 
2014).  
 
The third type of functional upgrading occurs in case when the lower-tier supplier is able to 
develop a new market. As an example of this type of functional upgrading could serve a new 
technical solution to a given problem or a new combination of existing products, such as 
development of new types of airbags under the car boot to protect pedestrians or installation of 
parking cameras into the car locks. This type of functional upgrading is bound to be rather 
infrequent as the number of lower-tier suppliers capable of making such a breakthrough is 
limited.   
 
Finally, from a regional perspective, the fourth type of functional upgrading might be the 
attraction of higher-tier supplier into the region. Localisation of a higher-tier supplier could have 
a multiplier effect upon local companies, especially via enhanced contracting opportunities as 
well as due to several spillover effects like production and technology learning (see Pavlínek, 
Žížalová, 2014). According to these authors, production and technology learning can be 
particularly intensive in case the local company becomes directly engaged in particular global 
production network(s). In addition, in case that higher-tier supplier would open its R&D centre in 
the region, this might result in augmenting R&D capacities in the region and resulting enhanced 
offer of highly-qualified job opportunities. 
 
Obviously, any enhancement strategy, including varying sorts of functional upgrading, is 
conditioned by numerous factors. Nevertheless, the key among those factors is the strategic intent 
of owners and/or of plant managers (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Second fundamental factor 
influencing upgrading prospects of a given firm is the type of governance. As has been 
extensively argued in the literature, some forms of GPNs´ governance provide better 
opportunities for particular types of upgrading than others (see esp. Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2004). Therefore, consideration of type of GPN governance (network, modular, quasi-
hierarchical, see - Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004 or, for alternative typology, Sturgeon et al, 
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2008) the particular supplier is subjected to represents an important starting point for 
consideration of possible upgrading strategies. Importantly, in reflection of varying modes of 
GPNs´ governance, diverse combinations and/or successions of types of upgrading can be 
foreseen. Let’s take for example the company, which is integrated into a rigidly governed quasi-
hierarchical type of GPN, with sharply restricted possibilities for functional upgrading 
(Humphrey, Schmitz, 2004, Pavlínek, Ženka, 2011). Moreover, in some GPNs, the lead firms 
might be even co-owner of some of their first-tier suppliers, which undermines chances for 
acquiring higher functions by other suppliers even further (Glogar, 2013). Therefore, possible 
upgrading strategy of firms engaged in such type of GPNs might involve, first, connect with 
another GPN with less asymmetric power relationships (chain upgrading) and, second, some sort 
of functional upgrading can be attempted. Obviously, a range of other mixtures of various types 
of upgrading can be contemplated as well.   
 
According to Glogar (2013) other important factors underpinning chances for upgrading are  
ability of firms´ managers to establish trustful relation to managers of first-tier suppliers or even 
of lead firms and the complex of external influences such as the overall quality of respective 
national and regional innovation systems (including policy framework – taxes, support policies, 
political stability, quality of education etc.). 
 
Therefore, to sum-up, clearly, the power of lead firms and of higher-tier suppliers over the firms 
at the bottom of the hierarchy depends strongly upon the powerlessness of their suppliers. 
Consequently, empowering these third- and second-tier suppliers (e.g. via supplying several 
GPNs or, esp. in case of more capable suppliers, even by producing their own product for end 
market) seems to be a promising strategy. Moreover, chances for upgrading of local firms can be 
enhanced by targeted effort of public authorities to remedy at least the major barriers within the 
existing institutional framework, such as imperfections in legislation, educational system and by 
designing a proper incentive system for mutual cooperation among actors such as firms and R&D 
institutions, etc. Given, the above-mentioned fundamental role of strategic intent of management 
to embark upon challenging upgrading strategy, a mentoring initiative for “sleeping” local 
companies can be considered.     
 
Table 2: Differentiated probabilities and potential benefits from upgrading according to position 
of companies within GPN.    
 
Type of 
upgrading 
Lead 
firm 
 
Probabi
lity 
Lead 
firm 
 
Potenti
al 
benefit 
First-tier  
 
Probabili
ty 
First-
tier  
 
Potenti
al 
benefit 
Second-
tier  
 
Probabili
ty 
Second
-tier  
 
Potenti
al 
benefit  
Third-
tier  
 
Probabili
ty 
Third-
tier  
 
Potenti
al 
benefit 
Process 
upgrading 
XXX X XXX X XXX X XXX X 
Product 
upgrading 
XXX XX XXX XX XX X X X 
Functional 
upgrading   
X XX X X X X X X 
 34 
 
- replacement 
of existing 
higher-tier 
supplier 
- developing 
new 
product/marke
t 
XX XX XX XX XX XX X XX 
- voluntary 
transfer 
X X 
 
X XX XX XX X XX 
Inter-sectoral 
upgrading 
X XX X XX XX XXX X XX 
Chain 
upgrading/ 
organizational 
succession 
X XX XX XX XXX XX XX XX 
Source: Blažek (2015) 
 
 
Downgrading – condemnation or blessing?  
 
In contrast to upgrading, the concept of downgrading has received relatively much less attention 
within the GPN/GVC literature and remains clearly conceptually under-developed (for 
exceptions see Barrientos, 2011, Rabellotti, 2014). This is twice unfair. First, the number of cases 
of downgrading can be in practice surprisingly high (lets recall the well documented truncation of 
higher-level functions in plants after their takeover by transnational companies massively 
proceeding for example in Central Eastern Europe after the fall of state-socialism (see e.g. 
Pavlínek, 2008, Barrientos et al, 2011). It can be argued that elimination of some higher functions 
can be in fact conceived as one of special modalities of much broader concept of downgrading. 
Secondly, in contrast to upgrading, which is widely referred to in the literature with a quite 
positive connotation (though multi-dimensionality of the concept of upgrading has been recently 
underlined - see concept of social upgrading – Barrientos et al, 2011), the concept of 
downgrading requires a more fine-grained approach. In particular, it should not be taken for 
granted that the undertone connected with the notion of downgrading is exclusively negative.  
To start with, while product and functional downgrading as the most obvious parallels to basic 
types of upgrading came to a mind (process downgrading seems to be unlikely), in case of 
downgrading a more substantial is to elaborate the intentions behind such shifts. This would 
allow not only better understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of suppliers within GPNs, but it 
would form also preconditions for formulation of some policy implications. Therefore, in the 
following text, several types of downgrading based on the varying motivations of such moves 
will be introduced and their negative and/or positive effects upon the company in question will be 
outlined. 
 
The first type of downgrading (hereafter called “passive downgrading”) represents an involuntary 
move towards the bottom of the supplier hierarchy induced by a decision of higher-tier supplier. 
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This shift “to the bottom” might be induced by a change of strategy of the main customer (i.e. 
higher-tier supplier) such as development of its own capacities for manufacturing of a given 
product, for example, in order to tighten the control over the production or due to various sorts of 
cost considerations. Otherwise, higher-tier supplier can be motivated to internalize the production 
performed by its lower-tier supplier also due to dissatisfaction with the product supplied or its 
delivery. In these cases, for example, the higher-tier supplier does not require production of 
intermediate goods from its supplier anymore, but just the supply of raw materials (this type of 
downgrading has been documented by Kaplinsky et al, 2010 on the example of Chinese import of 
logs instead of processed wood products from Gabon). Needless to say that this type of 
downgrading is unwelcome by affected supplier as the positioning near the bottom of the 
hierarchy of a given production network offers only minimal profit margin and, moreover, 
undermines its technology capacities. 
 
Another type of passive downgrading is a case when the existing supplier is excluded from the 
production network either partially or even completely, for example, when the demand for one or 
more types of its products has been dropped by a decision of higher-tier supplier. This type of 
downgrading is arguably rather frequent as it can be – inter alia - the result of a well-documented 
recent tendency to consolidate and globalize the supply base by narrowing the extent of the 
production network, esp. due to a number of managerial reasons (Sturgeon et al, 2008, Pavlínek, 
Žížalová, 2014). This type of passive upgrading is bound to be the most challenging one as it 
might easily endanger the very existence of the excluded supplier unless it finds quickly an 
alternative business model.  
 
Finally, from a regional perspective, a special case of passive downgrading represents a decision 
of higher-tier supplier to move out of the region. Such a decision is likely to have the opposite 
effects to the above-given type of functional upgrading consisting in attraction of higher-tier 
supplier into the region. Therefore, retreat of a higher-tier supplier from the region might result in 
decline in R&D capacities and in negative multiplier effects upon the regional lower-tier 
suppliers.  
 
The second type of downgrading - active downgrading - in not induced by a decision of key 
customer as in the previous case, but occurs in case the firm is not able to sustain competitive 
pressure on its current market and, therefore, is forced to refocus either on lower or smaller 
market segments or on production of components instead of the product for the end market. Later 
type of active downgrading has been relatively frequent in Central and Eastern European 
countries after their re-integration into global economy after the fall of Iron Curtain. Since the 
reintroduction of the market economy, many of the former state-owned companies found 
themselves suddenly uncompetitive and one of the options available was to specialise on 
production of some of components for which the firm disposed know-how and technology and, 
fundamentally, was quickly able to secure the demand. Therefore, active downgrading represents 
a mixed blessing for the firms concerned. On the one hand, the firm has been forced to retreat 
from its existing market; on the other hand, an increased specialisation upon a specific market 
segment or component opens a possibility for concentration of its human as well as financial 
resources upon corresponding products and thus to secure a better position within this new - even 
though more confined and perhaps even more fragile - market.  
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Third, strategic downgrading might arise as a result of change of business strategy of a well-
performing supplier dissatisfied with its current profit margin within the GPN. In consequence, 
this supplier might – along a number of other options such as functional and inter-sectoral 
upgrading - opt for downgrading by refocusing on component or a market segment where the 
firm could make the best use of its core competence and thus to increase its profitability.  
Like is previous case, also this strategy has its fundamental pros and cons. First, it is quite likely, 
that if a well-performing firm decides to concentrate upon provision of only lower value added 
services or upon production of some of key components of hitherto produced product it can take 
the advantage of its market or technological supremacy and achieve better position at the market. 
Second, however, the major danger connected with this type of downgrading might be the 
difficulty or even impossibility of finding the way back if the strategy fails.  
 
Obviously, as a result of this trinity of main downgrading motivations, various sorts of product 
and functional downgrading can be considered. However, it should be stressed that the impact of 
particular cases of product or functional downgrading would be to a large extent dependent upon 
the rationale for such a shift. Therefore, in case of downgrading, the type of motivation seems to 
be of primary relevance, while the form (product or functional downgrading) comes only second.    
 
Table 3: Types of downgrading according to main motivation 
 
 Rationale Prevalence  Potential loss 
or  benefit 
Example 
Passive 
downgrading 
Involuntary shift towards the 
bottom of the supplier hierarchy 
due to a decision of higher-tier 
supplier (change in its demand or 
expulsion of supplier altogether) 
 
Frequent 
 
 
Strongly 
negative 
impacts 
Shift of 
China´s 
demand to 
import only 
unprocessed  
timber from 
Gabon 
(Kaplinsky et 
al, 2010) 
Active 
downgrading 
The firm was not able to sustain 
competitive pressure on its market 
and was forced to focus on 
lower/smaller market segments or 
on production of components 
instead of final product or on 
provision of lower level services.  
Frequent Both options 
possible 
contingent 
upon 
circumstances 
Cosmetic firm 
Lybar has 
decided to   
move from 
the final 
market to 
manufacturing 
of some low-
volume 
substances 
produced for 
global 
players. 
Strategic 
downgrading 
The firm moves to specific market 
segment to make a maximum use 
Infrequent  Beneficial, 
but risky  
To be 
provided.  
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of its core competence and thus to 
increase its profitability.  
Source: Blažek (2015) 
 
Conclusions 
 
The aim of this Research Working Paper has been to deepen the understanding of multiplicity of 
possible evolutionary trajectories of firms embedded within GPNs. This is of a particular 
relevance for regions with less developed research and innovations systems as these regions 
usually suffer from weak endogenous sector and resulting branch-plant syndrome as well as lock-
in of a sizeable part of their economies as lower-tier suppliers within GPNs. However, while the 
branch-plant syndrome and its repercussions have received considerable attention, the impacts of 
lock-in of local firms into the lowest tiers of GPN remains under-researched. Therefore, the issue 
of upgrading seems to be a priority for these types of regions. However, while the issue of 
upgrading has received considerable attention in the literature, so far, a predominate focus of 
scholars was a perspective of suppliers from developing countries. Therefore, the relevance of 
these studies for lower-tier suppliers located in European regions with lesss developed research 
and innovation system seems dubious.  
 
Consequently, the paper tried to contribute to existing literature by two distinctive streams. First, 
in the GVCs/GPNs literature there seems to be a controversy about possibilities of suppliers to 
embark upon the most desirable, yet the most challenging type of upgrading – functional 
upgrading. It has been argued that at least part of the existing dissonance over functional 
upgrading can be attributed to the fact that functional upgrading represents in fact a rather diverse 
category. Therefore, several different types of functional upgrading should be distinguished as 
these subtypes vary not only in their probability, but also in their potential benefit for a given 
supplier. Consequently, the following major types of functional upgrading have been introduced: 
i) voluntary transfer of some higher level functions from higher-tier supplier e.g. due to lack of its 
R&D capacities, ii) developing new product and market, iii) replacement of existing higher-tier 
supplier.  
 
The second major argument of this paper rests in assertion that while the concept of upgrading 
received substantial attention, the concept of downgrading received only short shrifts. This is 
unfortunate. First, it can be reasonably expected that the number of cases of downgrading can be 
in practice rather high (even though not as frequent as upgrading as, for example, process 
upgrading, does not seem to have a practical downgrading parallel. Secondly, in contrast to 
upgrading, which is widely referred to in the literature with a quite positive connotation, the 
concept of downgrading requires a more fine-grained approach. In particular, it should not be 
taken for granted that the undertone connected with the notion of downgrading is exclusively 
negative. In particular, it has been argued in the paper that while the product and functional 
downgrading as the most obvious counterparts to basic types of upgrading came to a mind, in 
case of downgrading a more substantial is to elaborate the intentions behind such shifts. 
Therefore, in the text above, several types of downgrading based on the varying motivations of 
such moves have been introduced (i.e. passive, active and strategic downgrading), and their 
negative and/or positive effects upon the company in question were outlined.  
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The subsequent step in the research should be to attempt to derive sound policy recommendations 
reflecting such a diversity of evolutionary trajectories of suppliers of various tiers within GPNs. 
Currently, at least the basic point of departure can be proposed, namely, that in case of provision 
of public support to GPN suppliers should be carefully distinguished what sort of achievement 
the project intents to deliver. Consequently, projects aiming at various forms of desirable shifts 
within GPN might receive a certain priority.  
 
Clearly, when dealing with this challenge, the concept of smart specialisation can be a powerful 
tool (see esp. Foray, 2009, 2013), particularly, in transforming predominately asymmetric 
relationships within GPNs into more balanced ones, provided a suitable domain for future 
specialisation of local firms is selected based on existing knowledge and potential and if the 
relevant authorities or intermediaries facilitate the implementation of a properly designed strategy 
consisting both from desirable types of upgrading and downgrading  
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4. Challenges and opportunities facing regions with less developed research 
and innovation systems - the role of governance and strategy design: RIS3 
governance and regional upgrading RIS3 governance and regional upgrading 
 
Introduction  
One of the three sets of key research issues identified by Blažek et al (2014) with respect to RIS3 
in regions with less developed research and innovation systems refers to those challenges 
explicitly related with implementation. In particular, the first steps towards an effective 
cooperation among firms and other quadruple helix agents (government, research and civil 
society) that will generate new governance processes which can feed a smart specialisation 
strategy are recognised as critical. Governance in this sense goes well beyond ‘government’, and 
refers to the involvement of a broad range of quadruple helix stakeholders in the processes of 
‘entrepreneurial discovery’ that should underpin RIS3, leading to decisions with regards the 
activities that should be prioritised in the regions and their ongoing coordination and evolution. 
While such governance is challenging in any context, it raises specific challenges in the context 
of regions that lack the base of a well-developed innovation system in which firms, government 
and other agents are to some extent used to interacting in networks for innovation and research. 
Challenges thus stem fundamentally from a general lack of capacity and capabilities among the 
private and public agents within such regions to engage in such processes (Walendowski et al., 
2011; Charron et al., 2012; McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2013; Blažek et al., 2014), a feature that 
also raises the spectre of capture of regional strategic processes by one or a few strong interests 
(where the region is heavily dependent on the activities of a large MNC or a very strong science 
based university, for example).  
 
The lack of a well-functioning innovation system in a region usually goes hand-in-hand with a 
strong presence of local firms operating as lower-tier suppliers in global production networks, 
where they are squeezed on cost from both above and below and have limited space/scope for 
innovation. As has been argued elsewhere in this paper, such a scenario highlights the relevance 
of the concept of upgrading, which in its different forms is likely to provide a cornerstone for 
RIS3 in such regions. Yet while a RIS3 geared towards upgrading is a desirable strategy because 
of the nature of the economic structure of the region, the possibilities for upgrading are also 
conditioned by that very structure and the conditions associated with it (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2004). The weak, fragmented nature of the innovation system implies greater dependence on 
hierarchical structures and presents severe limitations when it comes to engaging the regions’ 
firms in governance processes oriented towards ‘discovering’ prioritizations that will mark a 
regional strategy oriented towards upgrading. On the other hand, however, the lack of existing 
capacity and capabilities in regions with less advanced innovation system can also present 
advantages in terms of developing new and innovative governance settings, given the absence of 
the institutional inertias that tend to characterise regions with more advanced research and 
innovation systems.  
 
Blažek et al. (2014) highlight the potential role of already-established cluster initiatives in 
regions with less-developed research and innovation systems as a tool for embedding the interests 
of the region’s MNCs in a wider context of production and innovation relationships, rendering 
the typically uneven bargaining relationship between government and MNC less critical and 
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opening up governance processes. More generally, cluster initiatives can be pre-cursors in 
fostering the types of governance relationships necessary for the flourishing of entrepreneurial 
discovery processes (Aranguren and Wilson, 2013), a role that can be particularly important in 
regions with weak and fragmented innovation systems where there is typically little history and 
culture of cooperation for innovation. Above all this reflects the need to identify and motivate 
people who have interdisciplinary knowledge and proven experience in interacting with different 
types of agents; these  ‘boundary spanners’, in the language of Foray et al. (2012), are the key to 
catalysing the broad-based governance on which RIS3 should be based. 
 
This focus on the human element is beginning to be felt and acknowledged both in debates 
around clusters, cluster policy and cluster management (Wise, 2014) and in debates around RIS3 
(Aranguren et al., 2014), amidst a widespread perception that the human element of how policies 
are designed has been neglected in general in regional studies (Collinge and Gibney, 2010; 
Gibney, 2011; Sotarauta, 2005; Stimson et al., 2009). However it is impossible to better 
understand the human factors that appear to be critical for entrepreneurial discovery processes 
without analyzing real live cases. Indeed, a key feature of the design of the Smartspec project is 
the presence of regional ‘living labs’, the study of which should help us to look inside the black 
box of the dynamic, evolving and ultimately human process of RIS3. Analysis of these cases is at 
an early stage, but the remainder of this part of the paper aims to draw some early reflections 
through comparing what we have uncovered about the RIS3 process to date in two Spanish 
regions with different levels of development and sophistication in their research and innovation 
systems.   
 
Reflections on emerging practice in Navarre and Murcia 
Spanish regions or autonomous communities have among the highest levels of policy autonomy 
in Europe, and the processes of preparing RIS3 for the European Commission have been led at 
the regional level (rather than at the national level, as is the case in some countries). Navarre is an 
industrial region, with relatively strong economic performance, a relatively well-developed 
innovation system, and its own tax-raising powers. In terms of its political situation, it is 
currently governed by a regionalist party in minority in the regional assembly. Murcia is a region 
in the south of Spain with quite different fundamental characteristics, in economic (a low 
presence of industry, less developed innovation system, and weaker economic performance), 
administrative (no tax-raising powers, which fall under the general Spanish regime), and political 
(the ruling political party is a national one, in a majority at the regional assembly) terms.  
 
Data for analysis of the cases come from an analysis of secondary sources surrounding their RIS3 
alongside around a dozen in-depth interviews with key players in the RIS3 process of each region 
that were conducted during June/July 2014. Early reflections on these cases are organised 
following the explicit structure that was proposed by the European Commission for the 
development of RIS3 in their Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart 
Specialisation (Foray et al., 2012). This guide proposes six steps for the development of a RIS3: 
(1) analysis of the regional context and potential for innovation; (2) governance and ensuring 
participation and ownership; (3) elaboration of an overall vision for the future of the region; (4) 
identification of priorities; (5) definition of coherent policy mix, roadmap and action plan; and (6) 
integration of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. As the guide highlights, the six steps 
“should not be thought of as separate and autonomous stages in the process, but as interacting 
components of a comprehensive design scheme whose implementation pattern depends on the 
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specificity of the regional context” (Ibid.: 18). Some reflections on the broad regional context are 
therefore worthwhile as a starting point. 
 
Regional context 
Navarre has a more advantageous context than Murcia in terms of overall economic performance 
and the development and level of sophistication of its innovation system, and the size 
characteristics of firms are quite different (higher presence of MNCs in Navarre and of smaller 
firms in Murcia). From Table 1 we can also identify significant differences between the regions 
related to space and demography (region’s size, geographic concentration of the economic 
activity, immigration, etc.), governance and politics (regional competences, decentralization 
within the region, legacy and quality of government, political stability, etc.), productive structure 
(sectoral specialization, kind of firms, internationalization, etc.) and innovation system (prevalent 
actors, innovative performance, etc.). These result in different degrees and combinations of 
complexity for the construction and development of RIS3. Regional complexity in this sense 
largely reflects the governance reality that characterises the region due to certain fundamental 
features of its geography, history, industrial structure, etc. Greater complexity should not 
therefore be judged as either positive or negative per se: there are cases when complex structures 
are necessary to govern complex realities; and also cases where unnecessary complexity is 
created, for example in the proliferation of intermediate institutions without clear functions.  
Table 1. Regional Context in Navarre and Murcia 
 NAVARRE MURCIA 
Population (size) Small (0.6 million) Small-medium (1.6 million) 
Density and 
urbanization 
Very low density, 
but urban concentration 
Low density, 
but urban concentration 
Population growth  Dynamic, linked to immigration Very dynamic, linked to immigration 
Decentralization Highest (including taxes). Regional government with 
elected assembly. 
Very high. Regional government with elected 
assembly. 
General quality of 
government* 
Medium-low (below Spanish average) Medium-low (Spanish average) 
Regional 
organization 
Provincial and regional governments coincide. No 
noticeable economic strategies in the capital city & 
counties. 
Provincial and regional governments coincide. No 
noticeable economic strategies in the main cities & 
counties. 
Political stability UPN (regionalist, right-wing) in power since 1996, but 
currently has a minority in the assembly. Until 2011 
consensus among the two main parties; afterwards 
severe institutional and political crisis, that affects 
even the management of the RIS3. 
PP (national, right-wing) has a large majority in the 
assembly. 
Sectoral 
specialisation 
Very high specialisation in industry (automobile & 
agri-business) & health 
Very high specialisation in agriculture and water-
related business, & to a lesser extent in petro-
chemistry & tourism 
Export orientation Medium-high (double Spanish average), due to 
industrial specialisation 
Low (1.1 times Spanish average), but high in 
specialised sectors (agri-business…) 
Firm Size Medium-high (double Spanish average, due to 
industrial specialisation). High presence of MNCs. 
Low (similar to Spanish average). Endogenous firms, 
in consumer-end production, are smaller. External 
(national) firms, in basic and heavy equipment, are 
bigger. 
Innovation system Innovation follower (RIS2014). Strong business R&D 
& universities. High educational level of population. 
Moderate innovator (RIS2014). Reasonable 
universities & public research centres, but weak 
business R&D & innovation. Low educational level of 
population. 
Economic 
performance 
High productivity, medium labour participation, high 
unemployment (but second lowest in Spain) & very 
high per capita GDP (second highest in ES) 
High productivity, low labour participation, very high 
unemployment & low per capita GDP (84% of EU 
average; “transition region”) 
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Source: Own elaboration based on secondary sources and interviews. 
* Classification of general quality of government from Charron et al. (2012).  
 
Alongside the general context from which the region develops its RIS3, it is important to 
understand something about the type of strategy that the region envisages when embarking on the 
RIS3 process. To gain insight on this question we can analyse the legacy of each region in 
planning and strategy-making and the frames of reference for the current RIS3 process (questions 
around the focus of the RIS3, its integration with other regional plans/strategies, and whether it is 
understood as a plan, process, or both) (see Table 2). Regarding the legacy of plans and strategy-
making, it could be argued that those regions with a longer experience in STI plans, in fostering 
public-private collaboration, and in bottom-up or participatory strategic approaches are likely to 
possess more of the capabilities needed to develop the types of processes and prioritizations 
required by a RIS3. In this aspect Navarre has a longer experience in government-led planning 
and strategy-making, developed with a strong presence of bottom-up processes. More generally, 
what each region understands about RIS3 will be reflected to some extent in the scope and 
approach to its development. For instance, in the case of Navarre, the Moderna Plan, which is 
considered their RIS3 strategy, has wider scope as a socio-economic development strategy than 
in Murcia, where the focus of RIS3Mur is on R&D and innovation. This is also reflected in the 
different relationship between the RIS3 and other plans and strategies in each case.  
Table 2. Type of Strategy in Navarre and Murcia 
 NAVARRE MURCIA 
Short name Moderna RIS3Mur 
Scope Socio-economic development strategy R&D & innovation strategy 
Legacy of plans Long history of plans & strategies, without thematic 
priorities until 2010. Less direct role of government & 
more presence of bottom-up processes. 
Moderate history of plans & strategies, including 
vertical choices. Less direct role of government in 
emergence of economic activities. 
Integration with 
other regional 
strategies/plans 
Moderna ranks highest in the region. Moderna is being 
developed, in determined areas, by more specific plans 
(e.g. plan for S&T). But these plans are under 
Moderna’s framework.  
RIS3Mur is under the IRIS-2020 general strategy. 
There were other plans (on S&T, Industry, vocational 
training…), some of them expired, and it is not clear 
their integration with RIS3Mur 
RIS3 document The existing Moderna (passed in 2010) has been 
presented as the Navarre RIS3. 
The RIS3Mur is an entirely new plan, passed in 2014. 
Source: Own elaboration based on secondary sources and interviews. 
 
The message here is that all of these (and potentially other) contextual characteristics of the 
region will in different ways condition the development of RIS3 processes; while they are asked 
to follow a similar ‘six-step’ process, regions do not begin the strategy process from an identical 
playing field. Bearing in mind that these two regions have quite different contexts and prior 
understanding of what a RIS3 should look like, we now turn to analyse the development of their 
RIS3 in terms of the six steps proposed in the RIS3 Guide (Foray et al., 2012), with a particular 
focus on Step 2 (governance). 
 
Step 1: Analysis on the regional context and potential for innovation 
The first step is to have a diagnosis of the region’s unique and distinctive capabilities around 
which the strategy should be constructed (see Table 3). Statistical availability is critical for this 
step, and in both cases this availability is very high. In contrast with some other European 
countries, there is abundance of regional data available in Spain and regional agents respond 
positively to information requirements from regional governments. Both regions have statistical 
institutes (IEN in Navarre and CREM in Murcia), which mainly collaborate with and diffuse data 
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collected by the national office, and there are a large number of administrative records in the 
hands of the regional governments (including tax records in the case of Navarre).  
Table 3. Comparing Step 1: Analysis of Regional Context and Potential for Innovation 
 NAVARRE MURCIA 
Statistical 
availability 
Very high Very high.  
Analysis 
conducted by 
regional agents 
Sufficient number of studies published by the 
government or quasi-governmental organisations, and 
some also by more independent organizations (e.g. 
Institución Futuro) 
 
Sufficient number of studies published by the 
government or quasi-governmental organisations, and 
fewer and less in-depth studies carried out by 
independent organizations 
International 
analyses of the 
region 
Although the Navarre case is mentioned as a case of 
good practice in several EC & OECD documents, the 
only complete documents available are the RIM report 
on Navarre (2011) & the assessment of the RIS3 by the 
European expert V. Harmaakorpi (2013). Navarre is 
taking part as a living-lab in the EU SmartSpec project, 
& Orkestra (2014) has elaborated a report on it. 
Although a European expert assessed the elaboration 
process of RIS3Mur, there is no publicly available 
report. Murcia is taking part as a living-lab in the 
SmartSpec project, & Orkestra (2014) has elaborated a 
report on it. 
Regional 
benchmarking 
Studies and visits to some regions and countries.   
 
Planned in-depth analysis of some reference regions.  
 
Type of 
analysis 
Very complete SWOT, specialisation (in 
industry/cluster, science and technology) & trends 
analysis relying on opinions of local experts, but lack of 
analysis on the entrepreneurial environment  
 
Very complete SWOT, specialisation (in 
industry/cluster, science and technology) & trends 
analysis relying on opinions of local researchers and 
business people, but lack of analysis on the 
entrepreneurial environment  
Source: Own elaboration based on secondary sources and interviews. 
 
Alongside the availability of data, it is important to have access to good analysis conducted by 
regional and/or international agents. In the case of Navarre analyses are published by 
government, by quasi-governmental agencies and by independent organizations such as the 
Institución Futuro. However, while Navarre has a good consultant in innovation policy, an active 
think-tank on competitiveness and departments of economics and business at the universities, 
they lack either the academic profile, or the orientation, resources or structures to assist properly 
the process. Indeed, the well-designed process of the Moderna Plan was partly conducted with 
non-local consultants. In the case of Murcia there are no research organizations or relevant 
consultants specialised in competitiveness and territorial strategy analysis, and despite having 
reasonably good universities in the region, they also don’t meet that need. The presence of 
international analysis mirrors that of regional analysis, with Navarre in a more advanced stage, 
and both regions are lacking in analysis that benchmarks against other regions. In Navarre some 
regions and countries with successful development models were studied and visited, even though 
they did not share structural conditions with Navarre; and in Murcia the diagnostic included in 
the RIS3Mur has been carried out without comparing Murcia with regions sharing similar 
structural conditions, although the analysis did identify potential reference regions for Murcia for 
the future.  
 
Finally, regarding the content of the diagnostics there are strong similarities between the cases 
that we suggest are probably symptomatic of how Step 1 has been applied in most regions. The 
analysis has been based on a very complete SWOT analysis, with detailed specialisation analyses, 
analysis of the science, technology and industry/cluster fields, and studies of the impact of 
international trends and societal challenges. Yet analysis on the dynamics of the regional 
entrepreneurial environment is lacking. 
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Step 2: Governance and ensuring participation and ownership 
This second step highlights the relevance of ensuring participation and ownership among 
different actors of the quadruple helix in the development of RIS3. The emergence of this 
governance is likely to be more complex if there are more departments in the government, many 
agencies and different levels of government operating in the territory. Navarre and Murcia both 
present similar scenarios in this regard, and also with regard coordination with neighbouring 
regions, the national government and EU institutions. All Spanish regions are members of the 
national IDI (Research, Development and Innovation) network, which was established in 2010 to 
generate synergies between regions in their R&D and innovation policies and has organised a 
series of meetings for exchanging experiences in the building of RIS3.i Apart from potential 
interactions with neighbouring Spanish regions that are included in these groups, in neither case 
have we detected explicit attempts to coordinate RIS3 with one of their neighbouring regions. In 
the case of Murcia, however, there are some signs that this is seen as a challenge for the future (at 
least in terms of generating funding), with plans to collaborate with neighbours (Valencia, 
Balearic Islands) to apply for ERDF multi-regional funding. In terms of coordination with 
national government, it could also be argued that the connection is stronger in the case of Murcia, 
due to a national party being in power in the regional assembly as opposed to a regionalist party 
in Navarre. Each of the regions has an office in Brussels, which is significant for coordination 
with EU institutions, although they both struggle to attract funds from EU programmes, with the 
proportion in Murcia well below what would correspond to them according to their regional 
R&D and innovation expenditure.  
 
Regarding coordination with non-governmental agents, the mechanisms are different in each 
region, with a more inclusive approach in Navarre perhaps reflective of the greater degree of 
experience and sophistication in existing collaborative relationships. The Board and Permanent 
Committee of the Moderna Plan are composed of members of the regional government and 
political parties, of business associations and firms, of universities and technological centres, and 
of trade unions. For the elaboration of the Moderna Plan there was a broad participatory process, 
which included civil society, and for the implementation and monitoring there are several 
“Moderna teams” composed of the type of agents mentioned above. In Murcia the RIS3 process 
is much more government-centric: the steering committee of RIS3Mur and the Evaluation and 
Monitoring Committees are composed of representatives of the government, the public 
universities, the business association and the technological centres; and there is no direct 
representation of firms, entrepreneurs or agents of civil society. 
Table 4. Comparing Step 2: Governance 
 NAVARRE MURCIA 
Regional 
government 
8 departments with R&D competences quite 
concentrated & a small number of agencies and 
intermediary organizations. 
Easier informal coordination. 
7 departments with R&D competences very 
concentrated & an average number of agencies and 
intermediary organizations. Easier coordination. 
Sub-regional 
levels 
Almost all the competences linked to economic 
promotion are in the hands of regional government 
Almost all the competences linked to economic 
promotion are in the hands of regional government, but 
clear local productive systems and some agents are 
organized locally 
Coordination 
with 
neighbouring 
regions 
Scarce coordination with neighbouring regions 
 
 
Scarce coordination with neighbouring regions 
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Coordination 
with national 
government 
Decisions in the regional government but 
communication with the national one; participation in 
IDI network  
Decisions in the regional government but fluid 
communication with the national one; participation in 
IDI network  
Coordination 
with the EU 
institutions 
An office in Brussels, participation as living lab in 
Smartspec & not many funds from EU programmes 
An office in Brussel with much less noticeable presence, 
participation as living lab in Smartspec & scarce funds 
from EU programmes 
Coordination 
with non-
governmental 
agents for the 
general 
strategy 
The Board and Permanent Committee of the Moderna 
Plan (members of regional government & political 
parties, business associations, firms, universities, 
technological centres & trade unions). Board 
participation for the elaboration, implementation and 
monitoring of the Moderna Plan, including the civil 
population.  
The steering committee of RIS3Mur (representatives of 
the government, the public universities and the business 
association). Monitoring and evaluation committees 
(members of regional government, the business 
association and the technological centres). 
Leadership of 
the strategy 
Change in leadership, but ‘collaborative leadership’ not 
generated 
Change in leadership, but ‘collaborative leadership’ not 
generated 
Entrepreneuria
l discovery 
processes  
Entrepreneurial discovery processes designed and in 
development, mainly through clusters  
Design/characteristics of entrepreneurial discovery 
processes not yet explicit 
 
Innovation 
agencies for 
participation 
The government’s institutional and political crisis 
currently affects negatively Moderna’s capacity to 
perform this role 
Not an agency with this role 
Source: Own elaboration based on secondary sources and interviews. 
 
The last two rows of Table 4 comment on the entrepreneurial discovery processes from which 
prioritization decisions should theoretically emerge in RIS3. In Murcia there is not yet an explicit 
formulation of these entrepreneurial discovery processes that is linked to the current strategy 
document. RIS3Mur made a great effort to identify new activities, related to existing or potential 
strengths of the region and to unexploited appealing fields. This was more of a theoretical 
exercise, however, and it is explicitly acknowledged as a starting point that is currently lacking of 
entrepreneurial discovery processes oriented to action among the region’s firms and other agents. 
This is also reflected in the current lack of a permanent space, such as that might be provided by 
an innovation agency or the like, for interaction between the government and the main 
components of the quadruple helix. Some intermediary organizations depending from the 
regional government keep connections with those agents, but those relations are more of an 
informal nature and the behaviour of firms, universities, research centres, etc. is quite reactive. 
The Moderna Plan of Navarre, on the other hand, has explicitly set out entrepreneurial discovery 
processes from the beginning, to be developed mainly by clusters. For each cluster or transversal 
priority working roundtables were set up, which operate with a similar method and develop 
action plans that feed into the overall strategy. However, while the attempt to create a new 
public-private organization – the Moderna Foundation – to develop the RIS3 can be seen as quite 
successful, since 2012 the functioning of Moderna has been hindered by the severe economic, 
institutional and political crisis in Navarre.  
 
Step 3: Overall vision of the future of the region 
The third step – generating shared vision – forms the basis from which a truly territorial strategy 
can emerge. Building a shared vision requires interaction between different agents, and in that 
sense it goes hand-in-hand with much of the discussions around governance in the previous sub-
section. Like the entrepreneurial discovery processes, the notion of shared vision can be made 
more or less explicit. In the case of Murcia, for example, the RIS3Mur has tried explicitly to set a 
shared vision, linked to the one included in the more general IRIS-2020 plan for Murcia’s 
development. Objections around this vision, however, include it being too general, applicable to 
any Mediterranean region, and too optimistic and detached from reality, comments that would 
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suggest that the vision is not so much ‘shared’ as was ‘established’. Navarre has also worked 
explicitly towards a shared vision, but in this case through the engagement of a wide range of 
agents in the process of developing the Moderna Plan. The thrust of the vision is around the 
necessity to change the existing economic model of Navarre and, in a participatory way, to 
identify the “roots and the branches” of the new model. As a consequence of such a broad 
participatory process, it could be argued that the vision has lacked focus, but it has been a good 
starting point that could be fine-tuned in subsequent steps. Unfortunately, this shared vision has 
been negatively affected by the aforementioned economic, institutional and political crisis. 
 
Step 3: Identifying priorities 
The thematic or vertical priorities in both cases are based on assessment of scientific, 
technological and economic strengths, as carried out in the diagnostic step, as well as on the 
market opportunities opened by societal challenges. In Navarre thematic priorities refer to 
capabilities both existing (mainly in the so-called green and health economies) and emerging (the 
talent economies), but the general perception is that there are too many thematic priorities 
included in the plan. In the case of Murcia, the degree of thematic prioritization is low in practice, 
because instead of focusing on those areas where Murcia actually has unique advantages, 
priorities include many activities in which Murcia doesn’t stand out or cannot be expected to be a 
leader in the future.  
 
Policy mix and action plan 
The fifth step in the RIS3 guide refers to configuring a policy mix and action plan to support the 
strategy. Both regions are in the early stages of articulating the policy mixes that will support 
their strategies. In Navarre, the Moderna Plan had a very well-designed process to arrive from the 
chosen priorities to concrete actions. But since there was neither budgetary projections for the 
deployment of actions nor mechanisms that would ensure the alignment of regional government’s 
policies and measures with the ones that stemmed from the plan, when the institutional, political 
and economic crisis shook Navarre the action plan was strongly affected. Thus in the last two-
three years many regional R&D and innovation programmes (which constituted the main source 
of public finance) have been on hold due to budgetary constraints. In Murcia, the unfolding 
process from strategic lines and objectives to actions has been orderly developed in the RIS3Mur. 
As a result, there is a list of actions, and for each of them a card with basic points (challenges, 
targeted groups…). The only budgetary data contained in the RIS3Mur, however, refers to 
estimated funds coming from each source (public, private and abroad), but not to the allocation of 
them among thematic priorities and strategic objectives.  
 
Monitoring and evaluation 
If policy mix design is in its early phases in both regions, then monitoring and evaluation is even 
more so. In the case of Navarre the Plan Moderna incorporates a defined set of indicators to 
measure the degree of advancement of the Plan and periodically request the opinion of the 
beneficiaries. However, at present there is a sincere recognition that through these mechanisms it 
is impossible to measure or know the actual contribution of the Moderna Plan to the established 
goals. Moreover, the organization responsible for the evaluation of the contribution of the 
Moderna Plan to the established goals is also responsible for the management of the plan, which 
goes against of the RIS guide’s recommendation. Finally, the set of indicators established to 
measure the degree of advancement of the Plan are very general and not easy to change by means 
of policies in the short run. Alongside those general targets it can be argued that there should be 
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objectives and indicators more manageable in the short-medium term. In Murcia, following the 
RIS3 Guide, the RIS3Mur tries to differentiate monitoring and evaluating. For the first, it 
distinguishes among three kinds of indicators: execution, result and context indicators. Execution 
indicators measure the progress in the implementation. Result indicators (which could also be 
named as “output indicators”), measure changes produced as a consequence of the implemented 
actions. Context indicators are related with the objectives and vision of the strategy. As for 
evaluation, RIS3Mur doesn’t pinpoint how this will be done, and it is doubtful that in fact it is 
going to measure the real contribution of each of the levels of the RIS3Mur (agents, instruments 
or programmes, priorities and the whole RIS3Mur) to the objectives established for each of them. 
On the other hand, evaluation is, again, expected to be conducted by the same organization 
responsible for the management of the RIS3Mur (the technical secretariat), and it seems that the 
RIS3Mur overlooks enquiries to beneficiaries as a complementary source of quantitative 
indicators and analyses. 
 
Concluding comments 
The above comparison of recent practice in the implementation of RIS3 in the Spanish regions of 
Navarre and Murcia provides some input for reflections on the specific challenges facing regions 
with less developed research and innovation systems. Firstly, it reveals a general issue regarding 
the importance of regional context in influencing the development of the governance processes 
that underlie RIS3. This is not so much an issue of regions with more or less developed research 
and innovation systems, but has to do rather with various geographical, structural and 
institutional factors that interact with one-another in different ways, and with the significance of 
path dependencies that mark the very vision of what a RIS3 might mean for different regions. 
The implication is that there are no single recipes for developing the right processes that will set 
in motion entrepreneurial discovery and lead to the appropriate identification of priorities that are 
then supported by ideal policy mixes and bolstered by effective evaluations. Each region has to 
find its own way, based upon its own context and history. 
 
However the comparative analysis also reinforces the general hypothesis that regions with less 
developed research and innovation systems face certain specific barriers in developing RIS3 
related to a general lack of capacity and capabilities among private and public agents. This can be 
seen, for example, in the differences in the structure of firms between the two regions, reflecting 
different requirements in terms of upgrading, and the different degrees of involvement of firms 
and other elements of the quadruple helix in the governance processes surrounding RIS3. That 
Navarre has a much longer experience in STI plans, in fostering public-private collaboration, and 
in bottom-up or participatory strategic approaches is evident in the differences between the way 
in which the two strategies have emerged to date. In particular, the Murcia RIS3 is more of a 
government-led plan and has fewer roots in bottom-up processes with other quadruple helix 
agents. Differences are also evident, for example, in terms of the degree of diagnostic analysis 
(step 1), whereby Murcia lacks research organizations or relevant consultants specialised in 
competitiveness and territorial strategy analysis. On the other hand, however, there are some 
hints that Murcia has taken issues of inter-regional and regional-national coordination more 
seriously. This could reflect different reasons, including those based on political relationships and 
necessity, but is nevertheless in line with the argument that regions with less developed research 
and innovation systems can present certain advantages in terms of the absence of institutional 
inertias, which can lead in more advanced regions to certain to inward-facing behaviours. 
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